August 3, 1998

Both sides proceed warily as they begin a realistic dialogue on security.

By Manoj Joshi

It began, as all negotiations do, with a "No". On June 12, at the first meeting after the nuclear tests between Indian and American officials in Washington, the message was: no seat in the UN Security Council and no testing or deployment of missiles. To top it all, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott told India's special envoy, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission Jaswant Singh, that the US would not back India for membership of APEC. As for being acknowledged as a nuclear weapons state, forget it.

Two months, three meetings and hundreds of manhours of hard bargaining later, the two sides are learning the art of the possible. Insiders say that last week's round of talks in Delhi were less successful than the previous one in Frankfurt because India is not yet willing to give the US clearcut signals of the steps it will take to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). American officials say that without these, the US will not commit itself to a presidential visit later this year or to a sequence of actions that could normalise Indo-US relations. Indian officials privately say that key action on this front, which could include a referral of the issue to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, headed by former prime minister I.K. Gujral, could take place after the August 15 conclusion of the celebrations of India's 50th year of Independence.

It appears that both sides are driving a hard bargain. The Clinton administration knows that if it wants its cherished CTBT to come to life, it needs India's assent. Says strategic analyst K. Subrahmanyam: "India's opposition to the CTBT was on grounds of national security and now that it has tested its weapons, it can go ahead and sign it." But, he adds, since the Americans seem to want the CTBT more than India does, "we are trying to see what we can get".

Delhi realises that this signature is about the only bargaining chip it has in its unequal stand-off with the US. India wants the technology embargo on its nuclear power plants lifted because that, together with a de facto nuclear capability, gives it all the attributes of a "nuclear weapons state". Indian officials emphasise that they do not want a formal acknowledgement as a nuclear weapons state, neither do they want a modification of the NPT or the CTBT.

The Russian agreement, even after the Shakti tests, to supply India two nuclear reactors which will be under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards is one way to meet India's hi-tech needs. Indeed, say officials, India does not necessarily want US technology; an American commitment that they will not block France or Russia from safeguarded exports to India will suffice.

Resolving the issue of "weaponisation" or "deployment" of nuclear weapons appears difficult at first sight, but, with the US indicating that it could live with India's declared nuclear capability and even missile testing, it is manageable. The question of "deployment" is a technical one. India's nuclear arsenal of air-dropped weapons has been around for the past 10 years anyway. "If deployment in this context refers to weapons carried on missiles," says an officer dealing with the issue, "we are years away from that situation." The Prithvi is seen as a stand-by while the Agni II system is developed.

There is another area where the US is pressing for action -- Indo-Pakistan relations. The American position till date is that this should be done through the process of direct dialogue between the countries concerned, a formulation that India has little grievance with.

Even assuming that all goes well, in the next round of talks scheduled for the later half of August, there are reasons to be cautious about proclaiming success. Having got a US commitment not to oppose its loans in the International Monetary Fund, Pakistan has now discovered that it too has leverage by not signing the CTBT. Its declaration to that effect after talks with Talbott in Islamabad makes it clear that its price for a signature is increased international pressure on India over Kashmir.

The fact that India and the US have been discussing these issues owes much to the quality of their two principal interlocutors -- Jaswant Singh and Talbott. US Ambassador Richard Celeste is fond of calling it "old-fashioned diplomacy", yet there is in their intercourse, a patrician ability to patiently listen to the other. The key momentum was generated in Frankfurt, where the two delegations met at a hotel near the airport and talked almost without break for seven hours the first day and another four hours before departing the next day.

The Delhi round of talks last week were a more elaborate affair that included formal social occasions. There was a lunch hosted by Minister of State for External Affairs Vasundhara Raje Scindia and dinner by Jaswant Singh. In contrast, the Americans were "down-graded" in Islamabad where their principal interlocutor was Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad. And there were no parties.

The Americans saw for themselves that India is keen to stabilise the post-Pokhran situation. Acting on Jaswant Singh's cue, Talbott met Gujral and Congress President Sonia Gandhi. The meeting with Sonia was disappointing since she refused to make any substantive comment on the issue at stake -- the CTBT. Gujral, on the other hand, told Talbot t that some time was needed to build a nationwide "consensus" on the issue. There are expectations that Gujral, who as foreign minister led India's opposition to the CTBT, may well be the instrument for a reversal of the Indian position as chairman of the MEA Standing Committee. In South Asia, the Americans know, determining what gestures signify "no" and "yes" is not easy. But they are taking no chances.

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