George in the China Shop: Pg1

The defence minister's recent remarks on China have stirred a hornet's nest, with critics charging him with having a hidden political agenda and derailing Sino-Indian relations.

Controversy and George Fernandes are inseparable. In 1974, he led a national railway strike that nearly brought the Government of India to its knees. Three years later, as industry minister in the Morarji Desai government, he locked horns with global giants Coca-Cola and IBM and threw them out of India. Last week, as if to show that the fire still burns, the 68-year-old Lohiaite firebrand brought Sino-Indian relations to an all-time low in this decade. This in less than six weeks of assuming charge as the 30th defence minister of independent India.

Paradoxically, the tempestuous ways of Fernandes have never affected his political standing. His detractors may denounce him as a misguided maverick, but few believe that the defence minister is not guided by both logic and deep conviction. Fernandes may be impetuous, but he is no political greenhorn. His arguments on a subject as complex as national security have been marked by steely consistency. In sabre-rattling on China, he has succeeded in shifting the country's security concerns to where defence specialists, and indeed the Ministry of Defence's (MOD) own annual reports, have been saying they ought to be -- somewhere between Islamabad and Beijing.

Fernandes' frenetic pace began in early April with the charge that Chinese patrols were intruding into Arunachal Pradesh. Then came the blunt assertion that China was "the mother of (Pakistan's) Ghauri missile". Even after interacting with the visiting People's Liberation Army Chief General Fu Quanyou and appreciating Beijing's "seriousness" in resolving bilateral issues through negotiation, Fernandes kept up the offensive. In a forceful interview on Home TV's In Focus with Karan programme, he lucidly argued that it was not in India's interest to understate problems with China. Lamenting the "reluctance to face the reality that China's intentions need to be questioned", he repeated the charge of Chinese perfidy -- missiles to Pakistan, military aid to the junta in Myanmar and a virtual land and water encirclement of India.

Fernandes' declaration of China as the "potential threat No. 1" rocked the foreign policy establishment and rattled Beijing. It completely overshadowed his restrained appeal at the V.K. Krishna Menon memorial lecture in Delhi for resolving all pending disputes with Islamabad and Beijing through "decisive" dialogue. The riposte came a day later. Responding to a question by a correspondent of the state-owned Voice of America on May 5, the official Chinese spokesman brushed aside the charge that China was the "biggest threat" to India as "absolutely ridiculous and not worthy of refutation". Separating the defence minister from his Government, he said that "remarks by Fernandes have seriously sabotaged the favourable atmosphere for improving bilateral relations".

The Opposition was quick to react. The CPI(M) accused Fernandes of "disrupting the nationally accepted course of improvement of relations" between India and China. Former prime minister I.K. Gujral charged him with "adventurism". Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's low-key approach to foreign policy, Gujral lamented, was encouraging his defence minister to take over foreign policy-making and ride roughshod over the "meekish (sic) protests by the PMO (Prime Minister's Office)."

Gujral's sly assertion had the desired result. The PMO let it be known that the defence minister's views were "not a reflection of a considered view of the Government" and that there had been no rethinking on India's China policy. A PMO official even termed Fernandes' remarks as "uncalled for and unprovoked". This, in turn, prompted speculation that Vajpayee was considering a new defence minister.

From the idyllic bliss of the Andaman Islands -- which he wants renamed -- Fernandes sought to dispel the "feeling in certain circles that I am not keen on an India-China dialogue". All he wanted was to "put the spotlight on the contentious issues with our neighbours with the purpose of making the Indian people conscious about them".

There is little doubt that the Pakistan-obsessed foreign policy establishment is clearly unsettled by Fernandes' Sinophobia. Since the early '80s the mod annual reports have been guardedly articulating the view that China was India's most potent threat. In putting national security before foreign policy, Fernandes was applying a long-overdue corrective which the BJP has been publicly demanding for quite some time.

Not that Fernandes is assuming the unlikely role of the BJP's stalking horse. The defence minister's forthrightness has its origins in his profoundly anti-communist, socialist background, his passionate involvement with pro-democracy movements in Tibet and Myanmar, current politics and his future plans. Fernandes has skilfully managed to combine his ministry's long-held views, his coalition partner's inclinations and his personal beliefs. In the process, he has also shown up the pusillanimity of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). For example, even in the '81-'97 period that India and China have engaged in dialogue, Beijing has also been supplying Pakistan nuclear weapons material and missiles. Yet, there has been a certain squeamishness on the part of South Block to cry foul. Even on May 6, the foreign office spokesman tried to put a lid on the issue by declaring that "both sides have agreed to build a constructive and cooperative relationship".

Simultaneous engagement and containment is a classic big-power strategy that is being applied in turn on China by the US. But where China has masterfully countered the US and managed to effectively check its containment, India's antiquated governmental structure and careless political management has been unable to respond purposefully. Examined closely, each of Fernandes' remarks have focused on the need for a strategic doctrine. However, so ossified is the structure of policy-making and decision-taking that his effort to draw attention to the China problem is made out to be a dangerously destabilising act.

There is another less visible element in the episode: the relationship between India, China and the US. There are many who charge Washington with fanning anti-Chinese sentiments and using India as a cat's paw to check Beijing. In the early 1950s India did participate in some half-baked anti-Chinese CIA activity, like the Khamba rebellion in Tibet, and ended up the loser. But India of the '90s has moved a distance away from naive, woolly-headedness. The pragmatic legacy of Indira Gandhi has become enduring. In any case, the national security management that the BJP-led Government advocates -- including intensive debate and discussion in a specialist National Security Council -- should provide a natural check to any form of adventurism. Washington appears to have realised this, a reason why Defence Secretary William S. Cohen has invited Fernandes for talks.

For a person who was reluctant to take charge of the defence portfolio because he lacked a suitable wardrobe for ceremonial occasions, Fernandes' robust articulation of India's national security concerns has come as a surprise. His missionary zeal may appear unorthodox and controversial, but he has already won the confidence of the defence establishment. Initially, the stuffy, hierarchy-conscious top brass was apprehensive of a minister who was too casual in his dress and rarely brushed his tousled hair. But they soon came to respect his intellectual acuity and commitment to the assignment. In his first week as defence minister, Fernandes sat through countless briefings ranging from operational subjects to those involving salaries and allowances. During the annual army commanders' conference last month, Fernandes not only attended the inaugural functions, but also sat through most of the operational discussions in the four days thereafter. In addition, he has visited field areas from Arunachal to Rajasthan and the Andamans to Siachen. No wonder the service chiefs are bowled over: "At last we have a minister who actually reads the papers put up to him."

Fernandes also showed he could act quickly and decisively. In the first week of holding office, he ordered the revival of the Defence Minister's Committee, where the three service chiefs would formally meet him, the defence secretary and the other two secretaries in the ministry. Fernandes' aim was to ensure speedy decision-making by repairing the strained relationship between the uniformed branch and civilians in the ministry.

Despite this, the army is wary of the minister's criticism of China. "We simply cannot afford to antagonise the Chinese at this point," says a general. "We are fully stretched in combating insurgency in the country and if we have to deal with renewed tensions on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the army could well break down," he warned. This is a far cry indeed from the force whose Exercise Chequerboard (see box) broke the logjam of sterile "official-level talks" between 1981-1988 and led to the crucial agreements in 1993 and 1996.

In his most recent controversy, Fernandes appears to have few public defenders, apart from the Kanchi Shankaracharya, who gave him a generous pat on the back in Calcutta last week. Although instinctively in support of the minister, the BJP has said little about the issue. Perhaps there is a message in its silence. Vajpayee has studiously avoided any impression of condemnation. An mea official says that while the prime minister has kept his distance from the controversy, "Fernandes has merely taken one step back. He has not recanted". The BJP's approach may well be to let an ally forcefully advocate policies it cherishes without entering the line of fire. If push comes to shove, it will have no hesitation in backing Fernandes all the way. This is one issue where the Opposition will be hesitant to join battle.

China specialists, however, are divided. Former foreign secretary A.P. Venkateswaran, who also served as ambassador to China, feels that overly criticising the defence minister would only be playing into Chinese hands. "The moment they (the Chinese) feel that you are bending over backwards (to appease them), they will take advantage," he says. He decries the "nervous attitude" that India has taken in handling the controversy. Another former ambassador to Beijing, C.V. Ranganathan, however, believes that both sides have lost out by using "harsh words". However, he does concede that Fernandes has a case in calling for quicker negotiations to resolve the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The views of the experts notwithstanding, there is a body of opinion that believes Fernandes may be articulating the "silent majority's" views on national security. As one official put it, "many of our commentators are busy finding a rationale for China's policies", referring to Chinese supply of missiles to Pakistan. Professor Nancy Jetley of the School of International Studies at Delhi's Jawaharlal Nehru University concedes a tendency to brush problem areas under the carpet.

Knowing Fernandes, the last word on the subject is yet to be heard. In reviving the China question, he has basically achieved what he wanted -- initiating a national debate on security. Those looking for the "hidden agenda" may not have quite detected the subtlety with which this self-declared pacifist socialist has effortlessly appropriated the nationalist thunder. Perhaps it required a rampaging George Fernandes to unsettle India's cosy China shop.

LAC
CHEQUERED PAST

The Indian Army's defeat by the Chinese in the border war of 1962 was a national humiliation, never mind the culpability of Nehru and his advisers in mishandling the situation. The nation reacted with an unprecedented surge of patriotism. The restructuring and expansion of the armed forces fortuitously helped in blocking Pakistan's surprise attack in 1965. In 1965 and 1966, there were clashes between Indian and Chinese forces in the Nathu La area of Sikkim, resulting in scores of casualties on both sides. But then peace descended for another 15 years or so. However, the border between the two countries defined by an undelineated Line of Actual Control (LAC), resulting in claims and counter-claims.

In the early '80s, the decision to defend instead of abandoning Tawang in the North-east in some future conflict touched off a new crisis. The Indians decided to actively patrol the LAC and the Chinese occupation of the Sumdorong Chu pasturage, north of Tawang, led to a media-boosted scare and official protests in 1986. The matter was complicated by the passage of a bill creating Arunachal Pradesh, a territory that China claims in its entirety. Simultaneously, there was another development. As part of Exercise Chequerboard, the army re-occupied the Hathung La ridge, across the Namka Chu rivulet, a quarter century after they had been pushed off it. Had it been a gradual move, the Chinese may not have been alarmed, but army chief K. Sundarji staged the event with a characteristic touch of military panache, airlifting an entire brigade to nearby Zimithang. The Chinese panicked and when they moved their forces forward, there were eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations along several parts of the LAC.

A torrent of tough talk from Beijing unnerved the mandarins in New Delhi, but the army insisted on standing firm. The result paradoxically was a thaw. Foreign Minister N.D. Tiwari visited Beijing in May 1987 to assure Chinese leaders that Indian intentions were benign. Both sides decided to take up talks with renewed urgency and the following year, Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing, returning Zhou Enlai's '60s visit. Five years later, the two sides signed the agreement on maintaining peace and tranquillity along the LAC. Ten meetings of a joint working group and five of an expert group to determine where the LAC lies have taken place but the pace of progress has been tardy to say the least. Hence, Fernandes' call for "decisive" negotiations to resolve outstanding disputes.