INTERVIEW: AIR
CHIEF MARSHAL A Y TIPNIS
"This isn't the end of the
story"India needs to
end the holiday on modernisation of defence equipment and reform the crippling
decision-making process.
By Raj
Chengappa and Rohit Saran
Wary of joining the battle in Kargil,
the Indian Air Force's (IAF) initial strike rate was average. But its pilots later
acquitted themselves well. Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis, chief of air staff, spoke to
Deputy Editor Raj Chengappa on the IAF's performance. Excerpts:
Why was the air force initially reluctant to go to
battle?
I take umbrage to someone suggesting we were reluctant. No way. The air
force is always willing to do its bit. And we know it is the telling part. But I did make
the point that if air power has to be used you cannot suggest what is to be used.
Close Support: Tipnis with army chief General
VP Malik and jawans in Kargil.
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What did the army want?
They said they wanted armed helicopters for close support in the battle. I insisted
that fighters will go in AB initio. For that I needed to have political clearance.
Why?
Because air power means escalation of the war. And we have to be prepared. I had to
activate my air defence all round not only for the airfields but for industrial and
strategic complexes in the country. My strike formations had also to be kept ready. Should
there be an attack on me my riposte had to be fast. So I said we must do it in a
deliberate fashion.
What were the reasons for the loss of two jet
fighters?
Basically the formation in which Flight Lieutenant Nachiketa flew took time
acquiring the target and he took much longer there. When he went in for the first attack
he was not well positioned. At such high altitude there are limitations of firing weapons
as it disturbs the air flow and the stability of the engine is affected. Nachiketa had a
flame-out as a result. He bailed out. The follow-up formation was told to locate
Nachiketa. I suspect Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja came in lower than he should have and was
brought down.
Did you know that the intruders had Stinger
missiles?
My orders before the operations began were explicit. One of them said you will
operate as though there are Stinger missiles available.
You lost a helicopter too and then stopped all
chopper operations. Why did you do that?
For choppers to operate the enemy's head must be down and their fire suppressed by
jet fighters. Then the chopper should attack within a time frame of say five minutes
before the enemy can recover. In this case, it appears the time difference was greater and
the chopper's counter-measure against missiles didn't work and it was hit. We then took a
review and realised bombing by jets was effective and accurate. So we suspended the
chopper attacks.
If you had gone by the army's request to use only
choppers what would have happened?
We would have been clobbered. There are no two ways about it.
What are the lessons the air force has learnt from
Kargil?
This was a small action and so shouldn't change things. There was no real air
opposition. We were not fully tested.
Would you call the Kargil operation a victory?
No, we just achieved our immediate aim. It needn't necessarily be the end of the
story. This time the calculus of Pakistan went awry. But I don't know how long Pakistan
can withstand domestic political pressure or the humiliation they have suffered. |
