Defence: Kargil Intrusion: The War of Words

Now for the hard questions as opposition parties at the risk of a public backlash try to punture the government's euphoria over Kargil.

No sooner had the government announced that the army had cleared the Kargil ranges of all the intruders from Pakistan than it was faced with a new and more difficult war. Of words. Opposition parties, mainly the Congress, raised uncomfortable questions about the army's inability to detect the invasion of the heights across a 150 km stretch on the loc. And also whether the political leadership had deliberately looked the other way even as evidence mounted about the build-up of Pakistani troops in the region.

Last week, the Congress launched what appeared to be a concerted campaign against the government for its misdemeanours at Kargil. It accused Defence Minister George Fernandes of not taking timely action despite being in the know of Pakistan's game plan at least a year in advance. Not stopping at just that, party spokesperson Kapil Sibal went further saying, "Vajpayee and his government are responsible for the total fiasco in Kargil for they went to sleep after the bus ride to Lahore and turned a blind eye while intruders were occupying Indian territory.''

So far Sibal has waved only a file number -- Brig coas-124/GSD/VIF/DG, dated August 25, 1998 -- that purportedly contains a report written to General V.P. Malik, chief of army staff, by Brigadier Surinder Singh, who till recently commanded the 121 Brigade that oversaw the Kargil sector where the intrusion took place. Claiming that Singh had cautioned his seniors of an "increased threat perception", Sibal says if they disclaim the letter, he will prove that the prime minister, the home minister and the defence minister were aware of the intrusion.

The army brass trashed the references made by Sibal maintaining that even the file number was wrong. Lt-General N.C. Vij, director-general of military operations, says, "There is an unambiguous chain of command... no brigadier can write directly to the chief of army staff." Yet there was no official rebuttal over whether Singh had written such a letter to any of his immediate superiors warning them of the possibility of such intrusions. Though Lt-General Krishan Pal, commander of 15 Corp that controls the 121 Brigade, categorically says, "There was no mention of any enhanced threat which would lead us to make radical changes in our approach to handling the region."

Unnerved by the Congress charges, the government -- which had been vociferously saying that there was no intelligence failure -- quickly announced the setting up of a review committee to be headed by senior defence analyst K. Subrahmanyam. The decision came a day after Vajpayee's assertion -- at a tea party hosted for journalists who covered the Kargil conflict -- that "on the face of it, an enquiry seems unwarranted". By setting up the committee the government thought its troubles were over. In fact, they had only begun.

Quick to question the scope of the review committee, senior Congress leaders have already dubbed it as an eyewash. The party's logic:

Brajesh Mishra, principal secretary to the prime minister and national security adviser, brushes aside the drawbacks. He points out, "The committee has a free hand to go into any question including Surinder Singh's claims. And the members are widely regarded as impartial. The government will act on its findings."

The Congress game plan on the Kargil issue is obvious. It is keen on puncturing the sense of euphoria that has gripped the country after the Pakistani Army was evicted from Kargil and whittle down any advantage the BJP government may have gained. It's a difficult and risky objective. If the Congress' knocks are perceived as an attack against the Indian Army, whose credibility has risen considerably after the crisis, its strategy may well boomerang. It has so far given no tangible proof to indicate that Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee deliberately ignored intelligence reports and was lulled into a sense of complacency by the Lahore bus diplomacy effort.

Yet barring the file number and some references to a letter, the Congress till last week had also not come up with evidence of the other charges it has been levelling against the government. If it is only relying on Surinder Singh's testimony it may find itself skating on thin ice. The army brass has been building up evidence to show that Singh's actions during the Kargil war conflicted with his claim that he had issued several warnings of the build-up. They hold him accountable for much of the initial setbacks in the operation that resulted in a high number of casualties. It was the main reason, they say, that he was pulled out of his command in the thick of the battle considered a humiliation by soldiers. Singh was initially posted as sub-area commander of Hyderabad but with the southern commander expressing reservations he has now been shunted to a post at Ranchi.

They also point out that Singh was strangely reticent about his concerns when even senior officers took a review of the sector. In early January, Lt-General H.M. Khanna, Northern Army commander, along with Pal, visited Kargil and held a meeting of all the commanding officers in the region. Singh reportedly was silent about the threat perspective and did not mention anything amiss in the surveillance infrastructure during that meeting. But with so much of controversy over the entire episode, General Malik has appointed an internal appraisal committee headed by a lieutenant-general to go into all the major issues, including why army was not able to detect such large-scale intrusions. Singh too is happy over the development and says, "Let the inquiry find out the real truth."

Yet, even if the evidence of goof ups is scanty at the moment, it has already resulted in raising larger questions. The Indian Army will have to answer why it failed to detect such a massive intrusion in a critical area especially at a time when it knew that the Pakistan Army could step up the proxy war. Also, why did intelligence agencies like the RAW and IB, which were supposed to warn the country's decision makers, fail to deliver? And was the government really complacent and even suppressed information so that it could go ahead with the Lahore diplomatic initiative? In short, could such a costly war, which saw 407 Indian soldiers die, been averted? The inquiries instituted will have to come up with answers not just to punish the guilty but also to take steps to ensure that the country doesn't commit the same mistakes again.

The Guns of Kargil
Behind the infantry's heroism lay the artillery's prowess

Brigadier Lakhwinder Singh, Lucky for short, makes no apologies for his tactics. The commander of the artillery brigade of India's 8 Mountain Division admits what he did was akin to using a sledgehammer to shell a peanut. After all when has a powerful gun like Bofors, capable of hurling over 40 kg of deadly explosive to a distance of over 30 km, ever been used like a sharpshooter to knock down well-entrenched enemy soldiers sitting on top of peaks? Or which recent battle has seen over 100 artillery guns both big and small lined up and fired simultaneously to pulverise the enemy in a small target area into submission?

This was the untold story. While the infantry came in for much praise, it was the artillery that worked hard to soften up the enemy. In a war the ends usually justify the means. Singh unabashedly admits that he took a page out of history to use what even his Corp Commander Krishan Pal describes as " one of the most innovative artillery tactics to win a war". He remembers reading how famous warriors like Babar and Ranjit Singh employed rows of master gunners to fire cannonballs directly at the enemy. His logic: if such simple tubes could be utilised in controlled direct firing then why not sophisticated gun systems? So he first tried out the technique during the battle for Tololing. A battery of six guns were lined up and told to make direct hits at targets on top of the peak where Pakistani intruders were holed up. It made the final assault by the infantry much easier-casualties were lower too-to give India its first major victory in the Kargil war.

Yet it was on a neighbouring peak called Point 5140 where Singh's brigade demonstrated how an ancient war tactic still held good. Singh ordered all available guns, including Bofors, 105 mm field guns and 120 mm mortars, to line up. In all they numbered over 100. He then told his gunners to fire them continuously at the positions held by Pakistanis on the heights. Singh even had rockets launched against them. So effective was the firepower that the infantry was able to regain the positions without a single casualty.

With the infantry getting more confident of the artillery's prowess it was even willing to cut down the safety margins and take some daring risks. Normally the soldiers stay at least 350 m away from a spot towards which the shells are directed. But with the guns proving so accurate they would call for shelling even when they ventured to within 50 m of the targeted enemy positions.

It was night when the brigade targeted Tiger Hill and the entire sky lit up like Diwali as they resorted to non-stop firing for several hours. The pounding saw the Pakistani soldiers running for cover though many of them were killed by the deadly fusillade. Intercepts of conversations had one of them saying: "Hell has fallen on us." The continuous firing made the infantry's task of capturing the hill much easier. Major-General Mohinder Puri, general officer commanding of the 8 Division, acknowledges that "it was the preponderance of the artillery fire that helped us score many victories".

The brigade has one regret though. It just could not silence the big guns of the Pakistanis. The result: splinters caused almost 80 per cent of the Indian casualties. Without a sophisticated weapon-locating radar, which Pakistan had, the Indian Army had to depend on the conventional method of observers perched at vantage points and directing the fire. But they were unable to cause telling damage. There were other problems too. Because of the rarefied air and strong wind currents in the upper atmosphere, the accuracy of the Bofors gun, especially over longer distances of 20 km or more, caused problems. Singh dismisses them as minor hitches. There was such a demand for the Bofors gun that while in the beginning there were barely 25, by the end of the war the number had swelled to 100. Not bad for a gun whose name had become infamous for other reasons.

-Raj Chengappa in Drass