Barely two hours after the attack on Parliament House on December 13, Indian intelligence agencies in Srinagar intercepted conversations between militant groups that they initially believed were vital clues to the identity of the masterminds. At 1.30 p.m. they picked up a discussion on wireless sets between Jamait-ul-Mujahideen cadres, known to be linked to the group that hijacked the Indian Airlines flight IC 814 in December 1999. The militants talked of two fidayeen (suicide squad members) belonging to the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, a militant group dominated by local Kashmiris, having been killed in the attack.

SOFT TARGET: The terrorists felt Parliament was easier to breach

Two hours later the lines crackled again. This time the transmission was picked up by the Jammu police. The message reiterated that the Hizb was behind the incident. Intelligence agencies believe that the initial intercepts may have been a smokescreen to throw them off the trail and make it look as if indigenous militants were behind the attack. By then they had narrowed the list of terrorist groups responsible to the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Osama bin Laden's Al Qaida.

Cover Story Early Warning # NOVEMBER 1: A high-level security meeting is held in Delhi after an intelligence report warns that a suicide squad had been chosen by LeT for attacks on Parliament House, the US Embassy, North and South Blocks and the Army Headquarters. # Security tightened at all buildings except Parliament House because that involves frisking VVIPs. This could be the reason why the terrorists chose to target it. # NOVEMBER 19: A four-member Hizb group leaves for Delhi. It includes its divisional commander of Kupwara Ejaz Dar and battalion commander Inayatullah Wani. # DECEMBER 6: J&K intelligence warns Intelligence Bureau that a LeT suicide squad has left for Delhi. Information passed to army and raw on December 9. Delhi Police informed.

Around 8.30 p.m. the same night, intelligence agencies got evidence indicating that the Pakistan-based LeT, the lynchpin of suicide attacks since July 1999, may have been the perpetrator. LeT's master control station-codenamed Khyber Pass and located somewhere near the LoC in PoK-crackled with a message to its covert wireless network in Jammu and Kashmir about the "spectacular action". The coded message, intercepted by an electronic warfare detachment of security agencies, specifically instructed the group's cadres not to speak to the media or other militant outfits about LeT's role in the attack.

The control station, which is usually hyperbolic, had suddenly turned silent hours before the attack and remained incommunicado for nearly 10 hours after the shootout. Intelligence officials privy to the LeT intercept say its message was essentially aimed at boosting the morale of its ranks which have been suffering big casualties in the offensive by security forces. Of the 108 militants killed in the Valley in November, 46 belonged to the LeT.

It is not that the administration was caught completely unawares by the five-member suicide squad. According to information made available to India Today there was prior information that terrorist groups would target five key buildings in Delhi. A high-level security meeting was held in Delhi on November 1 following an external intelligence report that a JeM suicide squad had been chosen by LeT for attacks on Parliament House, the US Embassy, North and South Blocks and the Army Headquarters. Officials say while the security of other buildings was tightened, the agencies faced problems when it came to Parliament House because it meant frisking VVIPs. Perhaps this is the reason why the terrorists chose Parliament, the symbol of democratic India, as their first target.

ACTION REPLAY: Militants used a similar modus operandi to attack the J&K Assembly

According to intelligence reports originating from Jammu and Kashmir, a LeT suicide squad had stationed itself in Delhi as early as December 6. It was to be a joint operation of LeT and the Hizb. While the LeT set up the five-member suicide squad, the Hizb provided logistic support-including a recce of Parliament, the car and the VIP sticker. The attack was preceded by a Hizb meeting in Delhi in the last week of November.

On November 19, a four-member group of the Hizb led by its divisional commander of Kupwara Ejaz Dar and battalion commander Inayatullah Wani left the Valley for Delhi. The other two members were Mushtaq Ahmed Bhat and Tanvir Ahmed Khan. This information was shared by the state police with the Intelligence Bureau which in turn passed it on to the Delhi Police.

On December 6, another intelligence report from the state police informed that a LeT fidayeen squad was reaching Delhi. Two of the squad members were identified as Qazi and Omar. The state intelligence passed this information to the army and raw on December 9, who then passed it to the Delhi Police.

In the backdrop of the confession by Al Qaida's suspected member Mohammad Afroz (see accompanying story) on the plans to blow up Parliament, the inputs on the Hizb's Delhi mission and the presence of the LeT suicide squad as early as December 6 were fair indicators of the militants' plans. Especially because the LeT is notorious for suicide attacks. In the coming weeks the various security agencies would have to explain why no measures were taken to ensure that even the outer security ring in the Parliament complex would not be breached as easily as it was on Terrifying Thursday.

"LeT's strength lies in its stealth," says a senior intelligence official in Srinagar. Its cadres are highly motivated "do-and-die" elements recruited and pumped by the organisation's jehad factory at Muridke near Lahore. "LeT's expertise in such attacks was evident from the Red Fort shootout last year," says another intelligence official. It is no coincidence that the Parliament attack was also on the 24th day of Ramzan like the Red Fort incident in 2000. In recent months, LeT has reinforced its position as the dominant outfit in terms of militant actions. "LeT has the wherewithal to strike anywhere in the country," declares Jammu and Kashmir Police chief A.K. Suri.

However, various intelligence agencies-the Intelligence Bureau, raw and the state intelligence bureaus-are divided on whether only the LeT was behind the attack because there is a evidence that the JeM could also have been involved. The JeM is headed by Maulana Masood Azhar, who was released by the Indian Government in exchange for the passengers of the hijacked IC 814.

Another reason why JeM tops the Indian list of suspects is the similarity between the Parliament attack and the car bomb attack on the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly on October 1. In that attack, JeM terrorists forced their way into the inner security perimeter of the assembly building but blew up the car when they were intercepted by security forces outside the complex. JeM claimed responsibility for the attack, only to retract hours later.

However, the PoK-based United Jehad Council has denied that any terrorist group fighting in Jammu and Kashmir was involved. Even so, the council spokesman did not rule out the involvement of bin Laden's Al Qaida. Incidentally, the JeM joined the council under the name of Al Furqan on December 12.

But there is unanimity among the intelligence agencies over the objective of the attack. They all believe it was meant to destabilise India and announce that the Jammu and Kashmir chapter of jehad was not over. The message perhaps was that the war in Afghanistan is not going to solve India's problems and that pan-Islamic jehadis are not down and out.

The perception in official circles is that the militant groups may have attacked Parliament at the behest of disgruntled elements in Pakistan's ISI who have been sidelined following the war in Afghanistan. It is felt that the Pakistani Government cannot risk the wrath of the international community, particularly the US, by supporting a terrorist attack. The alacrity with which Islamabad condemned the attack by "armed intruders", shows the Pakistani intention of distancing itself from the terrorists.

Amidst these conflicting reports, the police and intelligence agencies will have to patiently piece together the evidence from the incident site to nail the culprits. Perhaps a diary, which was recovered from the gunny bag of a slain militant at Parliament, may provide some of the answers.

-with Shishir Gupta