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Origin:
Founded the early 1980s as the military arm of the rabidly fundamentalist
Markaz Dawa Wal Irshad which is affiliated to the Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadis,
Pakistan.
Headquarters : Muridke, about 30 km from Lahore. The land for this huge
seminary was bought with Saudi donations.
Objectives: Swears by the Ghazwa-e-Hind (holy war against India)
slogan and considers its jehad in Kashmir as the gateway for the liberation
of the Muslims in India.
Area of Operation: Claims to have its modules all over India but it is
mainly active in Jammu and Kashmir. Has its bases in the higher reaches
of north Kashmir and Rajouri-Poonch and Doda areas.
Sponsors: The Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadis, Pakistans ISI, Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait. Gets liberal donations from the Arab Sheikhs in the name of
spreading Islam and jehad in Kashmir.
Composition: A foreign mercenaries-dominated outfit that has nationals
from Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Pakistan in its armed cadres,
numbering roughly 600, in Jammu and Kashmir.
Training Camps: In POK and Kunar province of Afghanistan.
Battle Order: Led by fire-spitting Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed. Amir-e-Aala
(Kashmir): Jameel-ur-Rehman. Chief Coordinator in POK: Abdul Rehman Dakhil
alias Abu Asbir. Chief commander in the Valley : Shamas
Of all the jehadi groups in Kashmir, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) is the
only one which still retains its predominantly foreign mercenary character.
Only 10 per cent of its cadres are believed to be local Kashmiris, mostly
for logistic support. It has operational linkages with the Hizbul Mujahideen,
a predominantly Kashmir militant group, for such support.
On a larger scale, the LET draws funds and fighters from an elaborate
network of madarsas (religious seminaries) and financiers in the ISI,
besides sheikhs in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Until recently, the LET had
strong Taliban connections and was using Afghan territory for running
121-day training courses for its Kashmir-bound jehadis. Its training camps,
also located in POK, follows a military regimen in high altitude field
craft and handling of sophisticated weapons and communication systems.
Those opting for jehad get a money packet at the end of their tenure in
Kashmir. In the ranks of the outfit are many Afghan-trained mercenaries
who have fought against the Soviets.
The LET was launched in Kashmir in the early 1990s to boost the sagging
violent uprising by local armed youth.The ISI strategy was to give a dominant
role to foreign mercenaries in its covert operations in Kashmir. In July
1999, soon after the Kargil war, the LET was turned into the centre-piece
of the ISIs new gameplan to bring about a qualitative shift in the
militancy which was then dwindling because of pressure by security forces.
That was the time when the LET inducted highly motivated jehadis to mount
suicide attacks against security formations across the Valley. Since then,
the LET has been the lynchpin of fidayeen (suicide) attacks. Out of 45
such attacks so far, at least 40 were the handiwork of the LET, including
the December 13 attack on Parliament and the one at Red Fort last year.
"The suicide attacks are part of the strategy to bolster militancy
and inflict greater losses on the security forces," says Jammu and
Kashmir police chief Ashok Kumar Suri. The LET, according to security
officials, draws its strength from its stealth. Most of its cadres are
shadowy figures operating under coded identities. It works through an
elaborate covert wireless network in Jammu and Kashmir which has links
with a master control station codenamed "Khyber" and located
somewhere near the LOC in POK. All the operational instructions are passed
on the wireless network in a coded language that keeps changing to defy
interception.
The LET, according to intelligence agencies, has been like an "in-house"
outfit of the ISI which uses it to keep the pot boiling in Kashmir. As
the ISIs most favored tanzeem, the LET gets extra consignments of
cash and weapons/explosives for special operations. The LET is also the
only militant group directly under the control of the ISI and is at its
beck and call.
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