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For the ruling
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 2001 should have been the year of deliverance.
For 21 years-or 50 years if the Jan Sangh pedigree is incorporated-it
had spoken incessantly of the threat of terrorism, the impending clash
of Indian nationalism and Islamism and the need to give Pakistan a bloody
nose. This year, the prophecy hit the world with a bang. After September
11, there was an extra bounce in the saffron camp as the only superpower
tacitly concurred with its threat perception. On December 13, when the
terrorists struck inside the Parliament complex, the BJP-despite the usual
gripe about a security failure- could well and truly say we-told-you-so.
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| TOUGH LINE: Many now share the BJP's threat
perception on terrorism |
| While Tehelka hit the BJP's image, the UTI crisis
shook the faith of the middle classes. |
Instead, 2001 may well go down as the year the BJP was forced to get
off its high horse, with its Government at odds with the nationalist constituency
it had nurtured over the years. Even as a confused Opposition veered between
a sharp turn to the left and backing the Government at a moment of national
concern, the BJP found its own core constituency lukewarm to its grandstanding.
Deprived of this political certitude, the Government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee
spent most of the year conveying a picture of listlessness. In the second
year of its term, it appeared to have lost the will to govern.
Part of it was, of course, sheer bad luck. When Finance Minister Yashwant
Sinha presented his budget in February, India was basking in the glory
of the IT boom. After decades of experimenting with heavy manufacturing
and the mantra of self-reliance, it almost seemed India was on the verge
of getting its act together in the New Economy. Sinha's budget received
lavish praise but the exhilaration proved short-lived as the US economy
moved into recession and the IT bubble was punctured. Then followed the
bear run in the stock market and the Unit Trust of India's US-64 crisis
and, abruptly, the mood turned to gloom and doom.
Politically, the Government was devastated by a combination of events.
The Tehelka revelations-particularly the tell-tale images of BJP president
Bangaru Laxman accepting a lakh of rupees across the table-destroyed the
BJP's image of being a "party with a difference". Followed by
the US-64 crisis which shook middle-class confidence in the country's
premier mutual fund, the Government lost face among its core support base.
Middle-class disillusionment cost the Vajpayee Government its self-esteem
and compromised its self-confidence.
It didn't help that this erosion of goodwill coincided with an ugly
controversy over the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). For some months, the
political buzz in the capital centred on the growing intrusiveness of
some senior officers in the PMO in matters of economic policy and national
security. There was a perception that a tired and indifferent Vajpayee
had become a captive of unelected officials who were pursuing their own
agenda, regardless of political realities. There were visible differences
in the Government over persisting with a cease-fire in Kashmir that failed
to curtail terrorism. Indeed, the Government gave the impression of incoherence.
The invitation to President Pervez Musharraf was an attempt to get over
this problem. The move, however, backfired disastrously. First, there
was inadequate preparations for the talks-only a naive belief that a summit
would lessen tensions. Second, there was no attempt to explain the abrupt
U-turn in India's Pakistan policy to the people. When the Agra Summit
turned into a non-event, the Government fell between two stools-it was
neither seen to be hawkish nor placatory. Finally, a pathetic attempt
was made by friends of the PMO to juxtapose the peacemaker Vajpayee with
his intransigent colleagues. It would have worked if Musharraf was seen
to be meeting India half way. But with the General unrelenting in his
Mission Kashmir, Vajpayee's peacenik positioning rebounded on him.
Agra was a failure of public relations and leadership and led to Vajpayee
retreating into his shell. The three-day "misadventure" was
mercilessly flayed at the BJP National Executive meeting, prompting the
prime minister to offer his resignation to the party a week later on July
31.
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| CAPTIVE LEADER: Vajpayee failed to rein in PMO
officials |
| There was no clarity on direction. Vajpayee veered
between being peacenik and hawk. |
The contrived resignation drama was a limited turning point. The party
and the Government rallied behind Vajpayee to emphasise his indispensability.
However, the touching faith in his leadership didn't address the root
of the problem-the lack of direction. India played its cards well during
the Afghanistan war and was acknowledged as a responsible nuclear power
by the US, the European Union and Japan. But the Government failed to
capitalise on this domestically. The anti-terrorism ordinance, POTO, became
the subject of fierce partisan politics and linked to next year's Uttar
Pradesh assembly elections.
The Government's problem was that its purported sense of urgency in
fighting terrorism was diluted by question marks over its integrity and
efficiency. Even hiccups like the one over George Fernandes could have
been overcome had Vajpayee demonstrated clarity and sure-footedness. However,
the prime minister's communication skills were rarely in evidence this
year. In international circles, compared to Tony Blair, Vladimir Putin
and George W. Bush, Vajpayee cut a sorry figure. He couldn't inspire.
It is this tiredness that made India's own war against terror that much
less effective.
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CURRENT
ISSUE DEC 31, 2001
Biggest
anti-climax: Mamata's Trinamool defeated by Left Front
in Bengal elections.
Biggest
foot-in-the-mouth: Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Ajit Jogi's
on BALCO sale.
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