NEW POSITIONING: Musharraf wants to tell the world that he is the great moderate hope for Pakistan

During his illustrious career in the Pakistan Army, General Pervez Musharraf came to be known as a commander who led from the front and was not afraid of taking risks. His peers also complimented him for having a sharp and analytical mind. Not only was he decorated for valour in the 1965 and 1971 wars against India, he is a rare soldier who rose from the ranks
of the Special Services Group-the commando unit known more for its daring than its tactical prowess-to become the army chief. The General now faces his toughest ever challenge, in which he must bring all his purported qualities to ensure not only the security of his country but of his vision for Pakistan as well as his own personal position.

Since the WTC attacks, Musharraf has presided over tumultuous changes in Pakistan's geostrategic outlook. He abandoned Pakistan's erstwhile allies in Afghanistan, the Taliban, even in the face of the possibility that this would be exploited by India, Pakistan's longtime rival in the region. In doing so, he also managed to convince his military colleagues to rethink a three-decade-long policy of cultivating "strategic depth" in Afghanistan to counter India. By siding with the US, he weathered criticism that he was America's general.

COVER STORY THE MANY FACES OF MUSHARRAF Mr Kargil, May 1999: General Pervez Musharraf, chief of army staff, masterminds the Kargil offensive. Its failure puts him out of sorts with the Nawaz Sharif government. The Usurper, October 1999: Musharraf pre-empts a move by Sharif to sideline him and successfully stages a bloodless coup. Assumes total control of all levers of power. The Great Dictator, November, 2000: In a masterstroke he gets rid of a major political headache by sending Sharif into exile in Saudi Arabia by a presidential pardon. He also keeps Benazir Bhutto at bay by pursuing the graft charges against her. The Politician, July 2001: Wins the propaganda war at the Agra Summit and emerges as champion of the Kashmir cause. Holds local bodies elections and makes moves to establish himself as a politician. America's General, September 2001: After the September 11 attacks agrees to ally with the US and abandons the Taliban and its two-decade-old policy of controlling Afghan affairs. The Artful Dodger, December 2001: After the December 13 attack Musharraf makes cosmetic moves to take the alleged culprits such as JeM leader Masood Azhar into custody to satisfy international demands.

Understanding that Pakistan would come under pressure to curb religious fundamentalism soon after the end of the Afghanistan campaign, the general moved briskly. He took decisive steps to curtail the jehadi culture that had taken root in the country primarily thanks to his predecessors. Even President George W. Bush acknowledged that Musharraf was delivering. As expected, his efforts in this regard earned him the wrath of the right wing religious parties and hawks who stood to lose the most from this realignment. But Musharraf rode out not only the public fury at his decisions but also the resentment within his army. He sidelined some recalcitrant colleagues to emerge as a leader firmly in control.

The December 13 attack on India's Parliament, however, put Musharraf in a piquant situation. The US and much of the world put pressure on Pakistan to take action against the groups alleged to be behind the assault. The massive build up of Indian troops on the border now poses the most serious threat to Pakistan's security since he took charge as President through a coup in October 1999. Especially after he left the Agra Summit with India in July 2001 as a leader unwilling to compromise on his country's fundamental interest. Having justified policy reversals in Afghanistan as necessary for preserving the security of Pakistan and its Kashmir cause, he is now faced with the prospect of abandoning one or the other.

With the threat of war with India looming, Musharraf must make critical decisions. His vision of Pakistan, which he has outlined many a time, has no place for the kind of religious dogmatism promoted by the jehadi parties. Yet to move against these elements under obvious pressure from India may invite the kind of backlash even he may not be able to bear. And a Pakistani leader perceived as having abandoned the emotive "freedom struggle" in Kashmir would only be signalling his own political death. The general is truly in a jam.

In the past week, Musharraf demonstrated some deft footwork in the face of such adversity. Understanding that he had to appear to the world, especially the US, as someone who was serious about tackling terrorism in his own backyard, he made the correct noises, rounded up leaders of some jehadi groups and the New York Times reported that he had even ordered the ISI to stop backing Islamic militant groups fighting in Kashmir and only to support organisations with local roots. So much so that President Bush mounted pressure on India to give the General time to act and prove his credentials rather than push him with war cries.

To demonstrate that he was not doing all this under Indian pressure, Pakistan brushed aside India's demand to hand over 20-odd alleged terrorists before a dialogue could be resumed (see accompanying story).

Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar claimed in Kathmandu-where he was attending the SAARC conference-that those arrested could be handed over to India only if the Indian Government provided proof against them and fulfilled legal formalities. President Musharraf took a much tougher stand. Just before he left for Kathmandu, he declared at a joint meeting of the National Security Council and the Cabinet on January 2 that "there is no question of anyone being handed over". If proof of involvement in terrorist activities is furnished against anybody, he continued, they would be proceeded against in Pakistan.

While such tough talk kept his domestic constituency happy, Musharraf also took steps to counter India's massive troop build up on the border and the threatening noises being continuously made, especially by India's Defence Minister George Fernandes. Pakistan put its own strike corps on high alert. "Pakistan has only deployed such forces that ensure Pakistan's defence," said Major-General Rashid Qureshi, the President's spokesperson. "It continues to exercise maximum restraint. However, the Pakistan Government will ensure that Pakistan retains the capability of a reciprocal action, depending on what the Indian armed forces do."

Pakistan made no bones that even if India limited its strike to the LoC on the Kashmir border, it would not restrict just to this sector its options of striking back. Any talk of opening up other fronts either in Punjab or Rajasthan essentially meant that Pakistan was ready for a full-scale conventional war. That set off alarm bells in Washington D.C. and in other world capitals-something that Pakistan knew would see them putting pressure on India to back off.

Musharraf was clever enough to understand that the US would not want a subcontinental war that would derail its Afghan campaign. With US troops stationed on its soil (at least two air force bases-at Jacobabad and Pasni-are being used by America for "logistic support") and Pakistani armed forces patrolling the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan to help the US capture fleeing fighters of Osama bin Laden's Al Qaida, Pakistan has significant importance for the coalition forces. Any diversion of Pakistani forces in a war with India would not only endanger the security of US troops, it would jeopardise the US strategy in Afghanistan. In addition, the risks of the US staying neutral in such a conflict would be as profound as the dangers of choosing sides.

The Americans did help in defusing a critical situation around December 22, according to highly placed sources. According to them, Pakistan was convinced that an Indian attack was imminent when it received intelligence reports about IAF planes being brought out of their hangars. Musharraf then conveyed to US Secretary of State Colin Powell that he would pull out his troops-almost two corps-from the Afghan-Pakistan border to move them to the east. This greatly worried the US and Powell's subsequent phone calls to Indian leaders only just managed to pull the situation back from the brink.