FRIENDS IN NEED: Musharraf (left) and Bush

A big banner spread across the reception area greets visitors to the imposing State Department Building just off Constitution Avenue in downtown Washington D.C. It reads:
"We stand united-we will not tolerate terrorism!"

To the Indian Government, especially after the December 13 attack, this assertion had a hollow ring. For years and more recently since 9/11, India failed to convince the US to broaden its war against terrorism to include militant activities in Jammu and Kashmir. All this changed on December 29. President George W. Bush himself stepped into the ring to publicly nudge Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to crack down on Kashmir terrorists operating from Pakistan. "I urged President Musharraf to do everything he could to crack down on the terrorist network that raided the Indian Parliament," he said, of his efforts at telephone diplomacy to defuse a potential conflict between the two countries.

CHANGE OF GUARD: An American soldier escorts Al Qaida suspects from Shibergan prison in north Afghanistan to Kandahar where the US military is holding many more prisoners. The US fears an attack by India on Pakistan will allow Al Qaida members to escape.

America believes that Pakistan is on the right course.

Then, in a quick follow-up, he empathised with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in another phone call. Later, he told the press, "While I understand his (Vajpayee's) anger, I was hoping that they were not headed for war. Give us all a chance to work with President Musharraf to bring the terrorists to justice."

Bush's intervention, coming at a time when border tensions are at an unprecedented high, mirrors the concerns of the US. At one level, it is extremely apprehensive of an actual conflict-and a probable nuclear war-being triggered by the present pile-up of forces on either side of the border. Furthermore, it fears that a war will also put the US defence forces, stationed in Pakistan as well as those operating in Afghanistan at risk.

US officials shied away from disclosing the exact number of troops deployed in the region. It is understood that the US has attached military liaison officers to the Pakistani formations on the Durand Line to ensure there is no laxity on Islamabad's part to foil any infiltration of Osama bin Laden's boys from Afghanistan. There are reports that the US is keeping Islamabad's nuclear installations and facilities under close surveillance following evidence of two Pakistani scientists leaking nuclear secrets to Al Qaida.

The US problem is that if tension heightens, the troops guarding Pakistan's border with Afghanistan will be pulled away to combat Indian forces. This will make the Durand Line more porous and help Al Qaida terrorists and Mullah Omar's men to infiltrate into Pakistan. Further, any flare-up on the Indo-Pak borders will restrict US aircraft from operating in Pakistani air space and virtually put an end to its Afghan operations. Besides, officials say it will simultaneously jeopardise the US' South Asia strategy, at the core of which is the co-existence of India and Pakistan. Traditionally, the US has steered away from getting involved in any South Asian conflict. This time, however, circumstances and opportunity have forced it to do so.

Now the US has to thread a fine balance of interests between its two allies to ensure the survival of its "best bet" against its war on terrorism. From the US perspective, Musharraf is the only Pakistani leader who can decisively end the creeping entanglement of the country's military and political institutions with Islamic extremists. State Department officials are convinced the Pakistani leader understands that containing the extremists is in his interest, as much as it is in the country's. He will, therefore, be willing to play along.

The new factor here is that Musharraf realises the jehadis are a threat to him too. The assassination of the interior minister's brother is sufficient reminder," explains Michael Krepon, founding president of the Henry L. Stimson Center and a South Asia expert. But the critical element here is India's willingness to first trust the General and then to give him sufficient time. The US fears that India will insist on immediate action. "We are not looking at the issue with rose-coloured glasses. Pakistan has to make difficult decisions. We realise that the pace is not satisfactory. But they are moving," says a State Department official who went on to add, "Don't think that we are not pushing. Privately, Pakistan is more willing than what it has done publicly so far."

There is now a greater convergence of views between India and the US after the collapse of the Taliban and the fleeing of the surviving Al Qaida members to Pakistan. They fear that the jehadis, with tacit support of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, may find shelter in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and regroup at a later date. There is a perception among diplomats and analysts in Washington that the US is using India's (and partly its own) brinkmanship to push the agenda with Pakistan. But addressing the terrorist problem will inevitably touch the issue of Kashmir. Therefore, the US, like the rest of the world, sees the resolution of the Kashmir imbroglio as the only solution to lasting peace in South Asia.

"This is the opportunity to play a creative role in South Asia. We have been asked by both Pakistan and India to mediate in resolving the issue-India, more indirectly than Pakistan. A dialogue with Pakistan is possible with the US as an intermediary," says Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution. State Department officials concur with the view but shy away from being described as an "intermediary". Senior Indian diplomats too maintain that the US had so far not indicated any such desire.

At present, the State Department is optimistic. "It is like manoeuvring a ship in high seas. It takes a long time to alter its course. We are in the right direction. It will take time, but Pakistan will be on course."