The strong point of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate is its covert action capability (CAC). Meant to serve as CIA's contract killer in Afghanistan against the Soviets, the agency has not only directed its offensive against India since, but has also been used by Pakistan's army and political leaders to muffle opposition.

Though there has been a debate since 1988 over the taming of the ISI, no military ruler is prepared to give it up. General Pervez Musharraf is no exception. The ISI's CAC is seen as a handy weapon to keep Pakistan's political opposition divided and to achieve its external strategic objectives.

Under US pressure, Musharraf may carry out a cosmetic revamping but will try to ensure that its CAC remains unimpaired and that it is better protected against external exposure than it has been so far. The Pakistan Army knows that India has a quantitative and qualitative superiority in the conventional and nuclear fields and that it has a decided edge only in its CAC. In national interest, India has denied raw even a limited CAC against Pakistan, seeing it as immoral and counter-productive. So, even in the unlikely event of Musharraf wanting to tame the ISI to satisfy the US, he may not be able to do so.

How sincere is Musharraf in his proclaimed determination to curb terrorism in Pakistan and to distance the state from terrorism in India? His January 12 speech and the subsequent actions provide part of the answer. Musharraf has banned the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) that indulged in terrorism outside Kashmir too, but has spared the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Al Badr that have, in recent months, confined their terrorism to the state. While the JeM and LeT, much to his discomfiture, have been loud-mouthed about their depredations in India, the hum and Al Badr have been discreet, denying their actions. The message: terrorism outside Kashmir is out, but will carry on in the state provided the sponsorship is denied.

Besides, in JeM and LeT, largely political and administrative cadres have been rounded up, while the trained terrorists have been left practically untouched. Most of these, around 5,000, have either fled to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir or have gone underground in Pakistan. Musharraf's speech was impressive, but we should not jump to the conclusion that it is the genesis of a new Musharraf, penitent about the past and promising for the future. He has not changed and never will. We must see him as the same old Musharraf of the Kargil days and keep up our guard.

(The writer is a former additional secretary of Raw)