"Today people are scared of entering these places of worship. It is a matter of shame that the police have to be posted outside for their protection. Mosques are being misused for propagating and inciting hatred against each other's sects and beliefs and against the Government too ... We will not allow the misuse of mosques. All mosques will be registered and no new mosques will be built without permission. If there is any political activity, inciting of sectarian hatred or propagation of extremism in any mosque, the management would be held responsible and proceeded against according to the law."
—General Pervez Musharraf, President of Pakistan, in his nationwide televised speech.

Tough words. But the Pakistani president may find putting them to practice as difficult. For many reasons.

As eminent sociologist Misagh Parsa in his seminal book The Cultural Origins of the Iranian Revolution points out, the preeminence of Islamic parties in the fight against the late Shah of Iran came about as a direct result of the crackdown on political dissent within the country. Since the mosque remained the only space available for political meetings, this strengthened the hand of the religious parties.

This is not the situation in Pakistan. However, given the centrality of the mosque in Muslim culture, the khateebs (those who give religious sermons after prayers) and the imams (prayer leaders) in Pakistan do enjoy a political influence beyond their status in society otherwise.
This influence is largely limited to the level of rhetoric but had increased manifold in the wake of the Taliban successes in Afghanistan and the mushrooming of groups professing jehad in "Indian Occupied Kashmir". Many mosques which were affiliated with hardline political parties—such as the JUI and Sipahe Sahaba—or jehadi groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad—became a rallying point for recruitment of private armies. Their target: mainly impressionable young men with a strong zeal to avenge perceived injustices towards Muslims or even merely their sects. The fact that most mosques have religious schools attached to them also provided a fertile ground for the indoctrination of young minds.
Some of the mosques, it may be noted, had also come to be used to incite sectarian and religious hatred and antipathy against the Government. The most obvious example were the political sermons given by many khateebs against General Musharraf's decision to ditch the Taliban and join the US coalition against them. Rallies against the US and the Government often began after Friday prayers from various mosques. And some imams even went as far as offering networking support for those wishing to join the jehad.

But much more troubling for ordinary Pakistanis was that sectarian terrorists had been targeting the places of worship of sects they were opposed to. Mosque massacres reached their apogee in the mid-1990s, forcing the Government to provide police and paramilitary security to mosques. It led to a drop in prayer attendance as well. In the last year alone, some 400 people, mostly of the minority Shia community, had been killed in targeted sectarian killings. The role of imams in inciting people and spreading venom had already been under attack from civil society. Musharraf, in his speech, even referred to an imam arrested from his mosque in Malir district of Karachi who, he claimed, had been involved in sectarian murders himself.

The measures the general has announced—banning the use of loudspeakers and dissemination of extremist views in sermons—have widespread support among most Pakistanis who would like their places of worship to be peaceful and non-controversial. Given the recent discrediting of those who incited people for a jehad in Afghanistan—where thousands of Pakistanis also lost their lives—it may also be possible for the Government to insist on a depoliticisation of the mosque sermons. But the challenge for the Government will be to show that it is willing to use an iron hand against those who disobey these strictures.