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It is often
mistakenly assumed that the great Indian nuclear debate is a contest between
nuclear advocates and anti-nuclear dissenters. The truth is that Indian
opponents of nuclear weapons do not count in any significant sense. Within
the public domain the influence of anti-nuclear activists is restricted
to a few middle-class radicals, and their presence in the policy community
is virtually negligible. Nuclear angst still does not strike a chord with
much of the Indian imagination. Indeed, despite systematic attempts at
generating nuclear dissent in this country, often motivated by other countries,
most Indians still view the country's nuclear might with considerable
pride. The real nuclear tussle, in both an intellectual and political
sense, is among those who agree with at least one proposition: India made
the right decision by going overtly nuclear in May 1998. But beyond this
limited agreement, there are stark differences. Sharp disagreements over
the nature of threats to India, the purpose behind acquiring atomic weapons,
the size and shape of the country's nuclear arsenal and the current state
of capabilities makes the nuclear debate a rich if sometimes a fractious
one.
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND INDIAN SECURITY:
THE REALIST FOUNDATIO-
NS OF SECURITY
By Bharat Karnad
Macmillan
Price: Rs 795
Pages: 724 |
The main faultline within nuclear advocates is between the so-called
minimalists and the maximalists. Minimalists take a more relaxed, a more
political and, dare we say a more Indian, view of nuclear deterrence.
For them the credibility of Indian nuclear deterrence does not lie in
numbers or in the baroque infrastructure often associated with the command
and control of these most destructive weapons of mass destruction. Instead,
the minimalists feel that having demonstrated its nuclear capability and
having at least a rudimentary delivery capability, India can now be more
or less assured that it has the means to deter countries that are likely
to pose a nuclear threat in the foreseeable future. Minimalists would
also argue that nuclear weapons are only one, and probably not the most
important, instrument in the country's resources that can enable it to
carve out a niche in the international system. And that India can and
has developed a nuclear doctrine which need not mimic western nuclear
theology or replicate the Cold War experience.
In
contrast, maximalists view the minimalist posture with deep scepticism
and concern, and fiercely argue that there can be no short cut, no quick
fix to acquiring a credible nuclear deterrent. Bharat Karnad is inarguably
one of the most "muscular" of the maximalists, to use former
US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott's description of his writings.
While Karnad has extensively published in scholarly journals in the past,
Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security is clearly his magnum opus. And despite
the 700-odd pages, it is also one of the more readable accounts of nuclear
politics produced by a strategic thinker in India. Be that as it may,
the book will undoubtedly provoke sharp comment and may cause considerable
offence for Karnad does not shy away from often taking personal jibes
at individuals and institutions that he disagrees with intellectually.
But whether you agree with Karnad or disagree with him, there is a refreshing
clarity to his views. A clarity that will make his volume a standard text
for some, but will frighten many others who will profoundly disagree with
his Machtpolitik. Consider the most provocative of Karnad's assumptions.
For him, the threats to the country are not just those from two of India's
nuclear neighbours, but also potentially from the United States. India,
for him, needs to protect itself specifically "against the wilfulness
of the United States and the sustained, if opportunistic belligerence
of China". And the recipe: "To deal with the more immediate
nuclear threat from China and to deter from the US coercively turning
its military prowess against India on any pretext in the future demands
the early acquisition of strategic armaments that the Indian government
has shied away from, namely megaton-yield thermonuclear warheads and weapons
married to intercontinental range ballistic and cruise missiles in sizable
numbers." And while Karnad has little faith in the Indian political
leadership, which he finds "pickled in self doubt", he believes
that the bulk of the Indian people are rooted in the "vagaries of
Machtpolitik" depicted in the ancient Hindu texts and "conditioned
by life-long deprivation, are hard as nails". In sum, contentious,
controversial, sometimes disturbing, but highly readable.
 
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