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 CURRENT ISSUE SEPTEMBER 23, 2002  

COVER STORY: FAST TRAINS

Rajdhani Express Disaster
How Safe are Fast Trains?


By Farzand Ahmed in Rafiganj and Sayantan Chakravarty

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2301 Crash: Sabotage
or Negligence?

Superfast But Supersafe?

It was dark and stormy when Madan Singh lay down to sleep at about 10.45 p.m. on Monday, September 9. The raindrops were beating down on the roof of his little hut in Pharsa village in the Rafiganj area of Bihar's Aurangabad district. No more than 10 minutes later, Singh thought he heard crashing sounds and cries for help. He rushed out to help. Thirty others joined him, armed with torches, pickaxes and lathis, and walked through mud and water towards the bridge. "The shattered bogies of the train were dangling over the bridge," he said. "We smashed the windows with pickaxes and pulled out about 40 passengers."

Those were the lucky ones. Singh had reached the scene of the worst train disaster in the country in the new millennium and the first major one involving the superfast Rajdhani Express that resulted in casualties. Over 120 persons of the 525 on board died when 14 bogies of the 2301 Up Howrah-Delhi Rajdhani Express plunged into the Dhawa river that night. Those who lived discovered how ill-equipped the Indian Railways, the second largest rail network in the world, still is when it comes to managing a disaster of such magnitude.

NIGHT WITHOUT END: Exclusive first pictures of passengers being rescued (above); and gas cutters being used to cut the coaches

For rail travellers, the invincibility of elite, superfast-by Indian standards-trains like the Rajdhanis and Shatabdis has been shattered by last week's crash. Since the Rajdhani was introduced in 1969 and the Shatabdi followed 20 years later, these trains were considered in a class by themselves. Hurtling along at speeds of 130 kmph-as compared to 80 kmph for mail and express trains-they have sturdy, powerful engines. Their airconditioned coaches have impact resistance features that are supposed to be subjected to the most stringent maintenance checks every time they run.

Such is their popularity that currently there as many as 16 pairs of Rajdhanis connecting all major trunk routes and 22 pair of shorter distance Shatabdis running every day. Annually, the Rajdhanis and Shatabdis travel 24 million km. That's 50,000 km every day, close to India's total rail length of 63,000 km. Catering to the upmarket passenger, these carry nearly four million a day or 60 per cent of the commuters on major routes. Now last week's 2301 crash raises the worrying question: just how safe are India's superfast trains?

THE LARGER PICTURE: The scene of the crash raised doubts about whether railway officials followed the safety drill for such trains

"The checks for a train like the Rajdhani are multi-layered and the most stringent amongst all trains in the country," says I.I.M.S. Rana, chairman, Railway Board. The five-hour pre-departure checks extend to minute details like the bush and pin assembly in bogies. "While we normally permit a gap of 1 mm in the bush and pin assemblies, we would replace them even if we detected a 0.5 mm gap in a Rajdhani bogie,'' says S.S. Godbole, chief mechanical engineer, Western Railways.

If such safety measures were indeed in place, why did the 2301 meet such a grisly end? Was it a case of sabotage or negligence? Rana loses no time in jumping to the conclusion that the accident was "a clear case of sabotage". According to him, fishplates-the steel bars, each weighing 15 kg, that join the ends of a rail-were removed from about 50 m from the Howrah end of the bridge. They were kept "neatly" by the side of the track along with a 12.5 m stretch of rail, says Rana. Adding weight was the fact that two years ago four people were arrested in Rafiganj for trying to rob fishplates. The sabotage theory soon gained currency and both Railways Minister Nitish Kumar and his deputy Bandaru Dattatreya endorsed it. Their reasoning: the accident site in Bihar was in the Maoist Communist Centre belt that has seen much violence in recent years.

HIGH SPEED WORRIES: Growing traffic and mounting headaches

That even an accident that claimed over a 100 lives could not be shorn of politics became evident when Rashtriya Janata Dal President Laloo Prasad Yadav thundered after visiting the accident site: "Even a blind person can see that poor maintenance and negligence, not sabotage, were responsible for the accident." Laloo may have been making a typically theatrical statement but the sabotage theory does beg several questions:

Just 50 minutes before the Rajdhani Express crashed, Sealdah-Jammu Tawi Express had safely crossed the bridge. Then, 20 minutes later, a goods train crossed the bridge.

Each fishplate has eight bolts-four bolts on each side. Each is the length of a fountain pen and is two inches thick. They are further fastened with helical pins called "jalebis". Using a heavy spanner, it would take at least 20 minutes to remove one fishplate, longer if the bolts were rusty.

RESCUE ACT: The army moved in quickly, but the railways was lax

A 12.5 m rail block weighs 750 kg (each meter weighing 60 kg). It would require many men and much effort to loosen even one block from the track and remove it.

In the past two decades, no extremist group operating in the area has ever attacked or derailed any passenger train.

There is growing evidence to show that key safety norms may have been compromised on the route that the 2301 had taken, especially on the bridge where the accident occurred. The standard operating procedure followed by the railway demands that special checks be carried out on bridges in the rainy season between June and September and tracks inspected up to 50 m on either side. "The monsoon inspection was not undertaken on many bridges here. Our staff has monitored the rise and fall of rain water only on a few bridges that are flood-prone," said K.K. Saxena, Mughalsarai's divisional railway manager.

ACTION NOT TAKEN REPORT

The recommendations of the Justice H.R. Khanna Railway Safety Review Committee in 1999 remain on paper:

« Close interaction with agencies in the US and Europe to improve impact resistance of coach bodies.
Not implemented

« Mobile train radio communication should be given high priority.
Still remains a low priority area

« Modify signals at level crossings.
No action, specially at 23,000 unmanned level crossings.

« Setting up of disaster training cells.
Disaster management still abysmal

« Make inquiry reports public to instill confidence in passengers.
Not implemented

That could have proved a costly mistake. The Kolkata-Mughalsarai section of the so-called Grand Chord route that connects it finally to Delhi is dotted with nullahs and rivers and has 740 bridges over which the Rajdhani rumbles every day. Bridge number 445, in railway terminology, over the Dhawa river, was constructed way back in 1916. While it is supported by concrete beams, the railway track is mainly held together by wood frames and steel plates. In 1958, the two-plate girder bridge was re-designed and upgraded to the much stronger four-plate girder meant for faster trains for speeds of 130 kmph. Since then it has not been listed as a Bridge Under Distress or bud, as the Railways term it.

Experts say that bridges with steel structures commissioned before 1930 are "already extremely fatigued". This makes them vulnerable to the high-frequency vibrations of a superfast train. Such bridges require constant monitoring. According to the Railways Ministry, the last major inspection check was done by an assistant engineer on March 9 and a divisional engineer on April 6. Apparently, on April 30 a senior divisional engineer of Mughalsarai division had prepared estimates for repair of 11 bridges, including No 445 which had "developed internal fracture" on one of the pillars. The possible collapse of the bridge is one of the causes being looked into by the inquiry commission appointed to investigate the crash.

Among other factors, the commission will investigate whether the tracks were faulty. Indian tracks, officials admit, aren't built for truly high speeds. The Rajdhani and Shatabdi are designed to travel at 160 kmph, the global qualifying mark for superfast. But they don't even come close to such speeds, largely because of the quality of tracks and their design. This despite the vast improvements that the Railways have brought about in recent years. India's high-speed trains almost exclusively operate on what are known as Group A tracks. These are entirely laid with 12.5 m long rails weighing 60 kg a metre, as compared to the lighter 52 kg for other track sections categorised as B, C, D and E.

To enable peak speeds, the wooden sleepers currently in use on tracks will have to be replaced with pressure-resistant styrene or any other durable synthetic material. Besides, Indian trains operate on British-era alignments with curves and gradients that are adequate for slower locomotives but completely unsuitable for high speed trains like the French and German ones, which run on dedicated railway tracks. With too many manned and unmanned level-crossings, it is difficult to build dedicated corridors and make sure no one strays onto the tracks. "Operating the 200 kmph-plus high speed trains would call for the creation of all-new dedicated rail corridors like express highways,'' says R.S. Varshneya, principal chief engineer, Western Railways.

The 2301 crash also raises the alarming thought: are the current tracks durable enough to withstand lower speeds than the Rajdhani? Tracks are so critical to smooth running that even a minor fault could cause a major failure. The fishplates could pry loose and disrupt the alignment of the tracks. Even the bed that the tracks are laid on plays a critical role. The formation is prepared on a bed of soil. It helps distribute the weight of the train, track and ballast over a wide area of natural ground. Its strength depends on the type of soil. The formation can be affected by heavy rains and slush, the kind witnessed at Rafiganj recently.

To avoid track-related accidents, constant and careful monitoring is called for. Apart from a daily patrol by "gangmen", ultrasonic testing of the tracks is carried out every three months to check for cross-levels, alignment and unevenness. Tracks and joint fatigues are tested by passing a weight of eight metric tonnes over them. If there is a 0.25 per cent difference between the two scannings, the scan is carried out again. According to Rana, the12-year-old, 60-km rail track at Rafiganj was last inspected on August 25 and cleared.

According to the railway safety manual, one-and-half-hours before superfast coaches like the Rajdhani are to pass a particular stretch, two gangmen are supposed to begin inspecting the tracks from opposite directions. They cover 5 km of the track and meet midway, where they are to exchange their patrolling books and notify the nearest station master if any anomalies are found. Reports now say that no such check may have been carried out on the day of the accident. If true, it is a major lapse.

For high speed trains, checking the worthiness of the engine and coaches is as vital as inspecting the tracks. There are established guidelines for issuing a Brake Power Certificate (bpc), a crucial document that permits a train to commence its journey. The wheels, suspensions, bogie (trolley on which the coach rests) and the air brakes are thoroughly scrutinised. The train is checked for electrical faults, from the power car to emergency lights (which fortunately worked at Rafiganj, according to passengers). So far these fast trains have been accident-free, but the crash has raised doubts.

Preliminary inquiries reveal that the Rajdhani Express had been inspected at the Howrah yard and a senior section engineer had issued a BPC to the 18 coaches and the locomotive. Sixteen of the 18 coaches were less than 10 years old-new by Indian Railways standards, where the average life span is 30 years. The 1982-made pantry car and the 1984-made AS2 bogie are the only suspects. Apart from an intensive scrutiny of the BPC, the inquiry commission will also have to look into such aspects as broken wheels, springs or suspensions that could indicate bogie failure.

As the commission probes the accident, including the possibility of sabotage, the larger issues of safety in the Indian Railways looms into prominence. Following a spate of accidents, the Railways in 1998 appointed a committee headed by Justice H.R. Khanna who recommended radical safety steps (see box).

Acting belatedly, the Government last year sanctioned Rs 17,000 crore as the Special Railway Safety Fund to be spent over the next six years. Of this, Rs 5,000 crore will be mopped up from the passengers by levying a safety surcharge. Few who travel on India's 63,000 km rail tracks will mind paying the extra charge, provided they are assured they won't be travelling in the death traps that Indian rail coaches often turn into.

-with Sandeep Unnithan, Sanjay Kumar Jha, Suman Chakrabarti and Labonita Ghosh


 

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