UPHILL TASK: The nascent Afghan Army on patrol duty in Gardez in Paktiya province

DIVIDED THEY RULE

RASHID DOSTUM The Uzbek warlord maintains a 10,000 strong force and acts autonomously in the regions he controls. ISMAIL KHAN The Tajik governor of Herat has a well-armed force of 15,000 which he maintains from the taxes he collects. GUL AGHA SHERZAI The Pashtoon warlord with an army of 2,000 now controls the former Taliban stronghold of Kandahar. KHAN ZADRAN He is among the many Pashtoon warlords in the South who refuse to acknowledge Karzai's authority. MOHAMMAD FAHIM The defence minister is yet to merge his 20,000 well-equipped forces into the national army. In the past few months, Tajik forces loyal to him are believed to have swelled.

Armies in most countries usually have only a dozen top generals. Not so in Afghanistan where commanders in the armies of warlords assume the title of general even if they head only a battalion. It was only when the new Government got down to its task of forming the Afghan National Army (ANA) that the problems caused by such indiscriminate use of designations cropped up. A senior official in the Ministry of Defence admits there are no clear estimates of the number of generals in the armies of the major warlords that are to be merged with the ANA. His guesstimate: 10,000 in all.

Such daunting numbers is one of the reasons why the Demobilise, Disarm and Reorganise programme that the Government launched as soon as it was sworn in June hasn't taken off. Working out an agreeable hierarchy would fox even the best management consultants. There are, of course, more serious roadblocks to establishing a 60,000-strong national army that is expected to gradually take over the defence of Afghanistan from the international coalition forces. Marshal Mohammed Qasim Fahim, Afghan vice-president and defence minister, admits it is "a complex task" that includes problems of not only getting new recruits but finding funds to house and arm them (see interview).

When the Taliban forces fled Kabul in December 2001, the US brokered a deal between the warlords of various ethnic groups to recognise the interim government headed by Hamid Karzai. The most powerful army was controlled by the Northern Alliance headed by Fahim and dominated by Tajiks. So his appointment as defence minister came as no surprise. The others such as the Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum in Mazar-i-Sharif, Governor Ismail Khan in Herat, Hazara chief Karim Khalili and the Pashtoon boss of Kandahar, Gul Agha Sherzai, continue to command their individual armies and are a law unto themselves in their territories (see chart). Between them they control over 1,00,000 fairly well-armed troops.

A fresh problem has been rebel warlords, such as Pacha Khan Zadran in the South, who refuse to acknowledge Karzai's legitimacy. In June, they even gunned down Haji Abdul Quadir, a key cabinet minister and warlord of the Nangarhar province. Since then Karzai's life has been in constant danger. When the Afghan President agreed to allow American forces to guard his inner security it seemed to indicate that there was a rift between Fahim and him. Fahim stoutly denies it. Last fortnight, the strengthened security helped when Karzai narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in Kandahar which saw Sherzai receiving bullet injuries.

INTERVIEW: MOHAMMED QASIM FAHIM

"We need to collect weapons from irresponsible people" As vice-president and defence minister marshal Mohammed Qasim Fahim is the second-most powerful individual in the Afghanistan Government. Fahim has the difficult task of establishing a national army and taming rebel warlords. He spoke to Executive Editor Raj Chengappa on his priorities. Excerpts: Q. What is the difficulty of forming a national army? A. Forming such an army is a complex task. It needs to be reconstructed keeping in view the composition of the Afghan people and the geography of our country. Our priority is the voluntary recruitment of people and their military training. For that we need to find resources. Apart from collecting weapons from irresponsible persons we also need to ensure that the national army is affordable to the Government and acceptable to the international community. Q. The major problem seems to be to get the warlords to merge their forces with the national army. A. The term warlord is media-created. No doubt we have some military circles but they are not an obstacle in the way of reconstruction or formation of the national army Q. The Pashtoons feel that the other ethnic groups now dominate the new Government. A. The Pashtoons are ruling. The father of the nation (King Zaheer Shah) is a Pashtoon. So is the President and two of the vice-presidents. The Financial Ministry is in their hands. I don't know what other post they will demand. Q. Can the Taliban regroup and become a threat again? A. They may or may not be able to. There are some individual efforts to regroup in the southern parts of the country. But there is no collective group or organisation as before. Q. Why haven't bin Laden and Mullah Omar been caught? A. The western parts of our country are dominated by tribals. Neither we nor Pakistan has 100 per cent control there. Bin Laden and the Taliban forces have their bases there and that's why we haven't been able to capture them. Q. Is there a rift between President Karzai and you? A. There is no such rift. We have the same programme and we are pushing hard to make it a success.

Despite American pressure, the various warlords refuse to merge their armies with the ANA. Part of the reason is that Karzai has so far not outlined what they would get in return for giving up their major source of power. Also as a western military analyst points out, "They are not sure whether the Government will then use their own armies to curb their influence."

There is also a "Pehle Aap" approach with no warlord wanting to be the first to give up his army as the situation continues to remain unstable. In Kabul a senior Central Asian diplomat says, "Karzai will have to give these warlords a big lollipop and say suck. Otherwise there is no way they are going to fall in line." The Government will also have to work out ways on pruning the numbers coming in from warlord armies and establishing an acceptable hierarchy.

US forces are exasperated with the pace at which Fahim's ministry has been proceeding with recruitment. For the past few months, they have worked out of a facility in the bombed-out former Afghan military academy to train the ANA. The Americans were hoping to train 18,000 troops by the end of the year. But they would be happy if that number touched 2,000. Last week, only the first two battalions passed out.

On his part, Fahim is wary of the games the Americans may play. He is yet to earn the trust of Pashtoon warlords who suspect he would use his ministry to promote his ethnic Tajik interests. Till such doubts are resolved, the armies of warlords will remain an integral part of Afghanistan's troubled tapestry.