For a man who wanted to live an extraordinary life splashed with risk, violence and danger, Pakistan's Inter- Services Intelligence (ISI) seemed the natural choice. A resident of Srinagar's Lal Bazar area, Sheikh, 27, was recruited into the agency and soon turned into a ruthless operative geared to kill, maim and destroy. He was the typical ISI sleeper who ran a handicraft business in Bangalore's White Field area and kept in touch with his bosses in Pakistan through his cell phone (98453-86748) and e-mail (hottest_sweetest_y2k@yahoo.com. In May, he arrived in Delhi to meet friends to firm up plans for blowing up the Indian Space Research Organisation buildings in Bangalore. The plans, however, came to an abrupt halt when Sheikh was arrested by the Delhi Police on a tip-off from the Intelligence Bureau (IB). The ammunition recovered from him included 8 kg of explosives, detonators, remote control devices and Rs 2 lakh in cash.

IN THE CROSSHAIRS: Prominent political leaders like Advani (left) and Singhal were on the hit list of Ali's gang Not even cricketers and filmstars have escaped being targeted by such groups.

Trained men like Sheikh are a part of ISI modules that comprise one or more operatives and over the years have spawned and taken root all over India. Last month, Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani called the ISI modules, "one of the biggest sustainable sources of terrorism in the country." Speaking at a meeting held to commemorate the NDA's three years in power, he said, "The fight against terrorism will continue and will be brought to an end."

According to the Union Home Ministry, over 200 modules are under observation and more than 200 have been busted in operations coordinated by the IB in various states between January 1, 1998 and October 15, 2002 (see graphic). It is not an easy fight. The adversary is invisible but powerful, its penetration deep, its missions bankrolled by a state agency, the ISI, and its coordination perfect. The ISI has brought together individual operators to function as a deadly unit: gunrunners in Karachi, fundamentalist preachers in Bahawalpur, hawala operators in Lahore, explosives experts in Peshawar and underworld dons like Dawood Ibrahim.

SITTING DUCKS: Delay by states in passing on vital information to intelligence agincies led to attacks like those on Parliament (above) in December; (below) the US Embassy has become the favoured terrorist target after 9/11

The destruction of ISI modules has not only helped prevent attacks on sensitive installations and important structures like the US Embassy, but also assassinations of the prime minister, cabinet ministers, opposition leaders, chief ministers, even filmstars and cricketers. In fact, plans to kill Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee are being set in motion every day by the ISI-backed outfits, says an IB official. "At any point of time there are 10 such modules operating in the country. The situation is grim," he adds.

Addressing a combined commanders' conference of the armed forces on October 26, the prime minister conceded, "The threats to our security from terrorism are not only restricted to Jammu and Kashmir, but also elsewhere in the country. Technology has now created chemical and biological weapons of great diversity that are difficult to detect."

In Gujarat last month, security agencies arrested Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) militant Samar Khan Pathan for plotting to kill Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi, Advani and VHP International General Secretary Pravin Togadia. This was the first ever arrest of an Islamic militant in Gujarat. Traditionally, the ISI and its jehadi patrons have recognised the need of not keeping the Indian state on the boil. Gujarat has served as a transit point for weapons and explosives of Pakistani origin intended for use in India. Disturbing Gujarat would mean disturbing this transit line. But the security agencies are on high alert now because of the realisation that radical Islamic movements like the Deobandi, its affiliate Tableegh Jamaat, Dawat-e-Islami and Ahil-e-Hadees are flourishing in the state.

Last year, a multi-agency centre (MAC) headed by IB Special Director Ajit Doval was set up to coordinate-nationally and internationally-the efforts and devise action plans against such modules. Though coordination among the Central agencies, the army and paramilitary bodies has improved, the MAC is often constrained by the sluggish pace at which information is provided to it by some states-often due to political compulsions-delaying crucial counter-terrorism operations. Vital inputs on local networks and contacts from police or information on prominent people associated with the terrorist groups is not easy to extract. So it can take months of intelligence work cutting across states and countries and daily coordination between various agencies for a single ISI module to be busted. The delay in intelligence gathering can develop into high-risk situations like the attacks on Parliament in December last year and the American Center in Kolkata early this year.

It took months, for instance, for intelligence officials and special police teams from Tamil Nadu and Karnataka to expose Bangalore-based "timber merchant", Ravi, alias Imam Ali, 32. Ali was responsible for the serial blasts in Coimbatore in 1998 and the bombing of the RSS office in Chennai in 1993. He had escaped from prisons in Madurai and Chennai, had learnt to assemble crude bombs and explosive devices in Dhaka and worked for the ISI-backed Al-Mujahideen of Pakistan.

According to outgoing Bangalore Commissioner of Police H.T. Sangliana, the Ali gang's hit list included Advani, VHP chief Ashok Singhal and Union HRD Minister M.M. Joshi. It also had plans to destroy vital defence installations. On September 29, the Tamil Nadu Police broke into Ali's rented home in Bangalore. He and four others were killed in a 90-minute encounter. The arms and ammunition recovered included a Kalashnikov rifle, several cartridges, explosive material, bombs, knives, grenades, cell phones, cameras, hand-written letters, a pocket diary listing important phone numbers and a large blow-up of Osama bin Laden.

DEATH BLOW: Ali and four others were killed in Bangalore in a 90-minute encounter

Another prize catch was Mohammad Abu Qasem, 50, from Dhaka. An ISI sleeper agent, Qasem had trained in Singapore, Pakistan and Bangladesh and possessed three passports. He was arrested by the West Bengal Police in September 2001 on charges of espionage after a tip-off from intelligence agencies. Qasem, who had been to Karachi several times, was a member of the Khilafat Majlis in Dhaka and was tasked with infiltrating army bases and cantonments across the country. He had collected maps of various air bases and had been passing on vital information to the ISI. Says Bhupinder Singh, IGP, North Bengal: "He targeted other ranks in the army, many of whom are disgruntled because their career options are limited or because of a financial crunch."

In the past four years, a clutch of modules operating in various parts of the country has been busted, including those linked to ISI-backed groups like the Al Jehad, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Al Fateh Force, JeM, Al-Qaida (backed by the Hizb-ul), SIMI (backed by LeT), Harkat-ul-Ansar, Al Badr, Deendar Anjuman, Khalistan Zindabad Force, Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jehadi Islami, Khalistan Liberation Force, Babbar Khalsa International, and Jamait-ul-Mujahideen.

There is a need, point out senior intelligence officials, to tackle the problem at a national level, not at the local police stations, where major cases are registered, or at the state level, where intelligence is limited. Police stations are not well equipped, have limited intelligence and don't even have the authority to handle crimes transcending states-most of the modules deactivated by the IB-led investigations have taken months of work, penetration and follow-up in various parts of the country, and sometimes with counterparts in other countries (when cell phone data is required for handsets and cash cards purchased outside India). As Neeraj Kumar, joint cp (Special Cell), Delhi Police, who tracked the underworld for seven years when he was with the cbi, says, "The nature of crime has changed. Now money from a kidnapping in Kolkata can be used for a terrorist strike in the US. We need to keep pace with the changing times."

SLEEPER CLASS: (From left) Sadiq,Ishtiaq and C.P. Rai from Azamgarh, Uttar Pradesh, were arrested in September in Delhi. Members of the Abu Salem gang, they had ISI links.

The distinction between underworld crime and terrorism is also being erased. In Mumbai, for instance, members of the Dawood gang are used by the ISI for planning and executing terrorist strikes in the country. Even though its ranks have been decimated, the gang retains an extensive network of footsoldiers estimated to be around 100. An equal number of members lodged in jails keeps the wheels of gangland moving. "There is a strong case for classifying this gang as a terrorist outfit instead of an underworld group," says Sridhar Vagal, JCP (Crime), Mumbai Police.

To incapacitate more ISI modules, the MAC needs to be legally empowered. Internal terrorism can no longer be tackled by a single police station. As Vajpayee himself said, all efforts must be made to "sharpen intelligence capabilities, and improve the multi-disciplinary effort".

The US has woken up to the post-9/11 situation and has set up the Department of Homeland Security to analyse intelligence from multiple sources under one roof. This will help identify threat perceptions and vulnerabilities. Likewise, the Europol (European Police Office) headquartered at The Hague is tasked with combating terrorism on behalf of all member nations.

The ISI modules do not work in isolation and it will require a far more coordinated approach on the part of Indian intelligence agencies to decimate their terror network.

--with Sandeep Unnithan, Stephen David, Suman K. Chakrabarti and Uday Mahurkar