At the insistence of America's allies, the war in Iraq has become as much a test of the international system as of Saddam Hussein, as much a question of a new world order as of a new, democratic Iraq. The diplomatic manoeuvring prior to war in Iraq marked the unambiguous end of the post-Cold War world. No one can say with absolute certainty how the "post-Iraq world" will be structured, but the fundamental paradox of the period between 1989 and 2003-the disparity between the reality of American global primacy and the formally multipolar structure of various international institutions, most notably the United Nations-must now be resolved.

POWER POINT: US President George Bush addressing the troops at the Central Command headquarters in Florida

Ironically and unintentionally, the French have done the world a favour by forcing us to confront this contradiction. France's stated intention has been to hijack international institutions-namely, the UN and the European Union-as part of its own cynical bid for global leadership. Pursuing a position as a "counterweight" to the United States, President Jacques Chirac, Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin and the French diplomatic corps have manipulated these institutions with tremendous acumen, outfoxing President George W. Bush, Colin Powell and the State Department at every turn. Given the gap in military and economic power between Paris and Washington, France's achievement is all the more breathtaking.

The French gambit has a theoretical logic to it. The idea is that the so-called soft power-expressed through international law, trade regimes and organisations such as the United Nations-is interchangeable with hard power: economic wealth, military strength, and the like.

The theory of soft power has been advanced to explain why no nation or coalition has employed the traditional tools of international politics-military force or economic restrictions-to challenge American hegemony. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, most academics initially foresaw only a transitory unipolar moment, and a whole school of "neorealist" scholars predicted the inevitable demise of the US geopolitical primacy. After a decade, however, the persistence of American leadership prompted some scholars to argue that the rest of the world, and Europe in particular, had turned to "soft balancing", employing soft power to limit the American exercise of hard power.

French diplomacy over the past six months seems to fit this theory like a Frenchman fits into his T-shirt. By ensnaring the Bush Administration in the United Nations, the French drove a wedge between America and the world, "softly balancing" what they could not otherwise influence.

Unfortunately for the French, their exercise in soft power seems to have had little appreciable effect. Chirac's manoeuvrings have not induced the Bush Administration to leave Saddam in power. Nor has the idea of a French "counterweight" proven terribly attractive to the rest of the world.

Russia and China, the other two members of the Security Council's Axis of Veto, were quick to distance themselves from the French folly. Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed regret and frustration over the US decision to remove Saddam, but emphasised that there was no irreparable damage to relations. Like Boris Yeltsin before him, Putin has prioritised economics over geopolitics, shrugging off the American actions he cannot prevent.

Beijing, still in the throes of a leadership transition, seems flattered to have been asked its opinion about Iraq. Like Putin, China's Hu Jintao is probably breathing a sigh of relief that President Bush did not demand a vote at the UN. Chinese strategists have found their game plan for patiently accumulating power entirely overcome by events since September 11-everywhere they turn, they see American strength. Beijing has become more cautious as the Bush Administration has asserted its global leadership.

France's soft power vision holds even less appeal for Europe. England's Tony Blair has transformed himself from Britain's Bill Clinton, triangulating his way to electoral success, into a modern-day Churchill-a heroic leader ready to sacrifice his career for his moral and political beliefs. Similar resolve can be found in Spain's Jose Maria Aznar, Italy's Silvio Berlusconi and especially among the leaders of "New Europe", such as Vaclav Havel, former President of the Czech Republic, and President Alexander Kwasniewski of Poland. These Eastern and Central Europeans understand the terrible price to be paid for a division between the US and Europe.

Even Germans-whose genuine revulsion at violence and war has been cynically exploited by Gerhard Schroeder-are waking with morning-after regrets. The prospect of American abandonment, or even the "repositioning" of US forces in Germany to the east, is genuinely frightening to Berlin. Nor do Germans want any part in a France-led European Union that is united by anti-Americanism.

Having revealed the French "counterweight" to be nothing more than a featherweight, the war against Iraq and victory there-measured in large part by the planting of the seeds of liberty and democracy in Baghdad-will define the start of a truly new world order. To steal Dean Acheson's famous phrase, we are present at the creation. The precise contours of what we are creating we still do not know. It will be necessary to build international institutions that reflect the new realities, and they may even be called the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But if so, these organisations will have to be fundamentally transformed to re-establish the link between the right to make international law and the responsibility to enforce it.

India has the opportunity to take advantage of this critical moment in history and play a vital role in developing the new world order. As international institutions are reappraised and reformed, India-as one of the great democratic, free market societies-could assume increasing global responsibility, beginning with a strategic alliance with the United States. Under such circumstances, it is easy to imagine that, in the UN Security Council of the 21st century France would be out and India would be in.

In fact, the world that is now suffering its birth pangs on the battlefields of Iraq is likely to be a world shaped foremost by American leadership and American power. It will be a world in which the stunning spread of democracy and political liberty that has occurred since the collapse of the Soviet empire is accelerated, especially in the Middle East. We appear to be moving at last from the post-Cold War era-a time defined negatively, by what it is not-to the time of an enduring Pax Americana.

Thomas Donnelly is resident fellow and Vance Serchuk is research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington DC.