With every square inch of his body appearing to be encased in metal plate, Major Matt Baker, commander of the US Marine Corps armour unit that swept through central Baghdad last week, stood in front of the Palestine Hotel and made a statement that will keep Pentagon war-planners awake at night with worry. "The Marines are in the war-making business, not the policing business. We want to get out of here as soon as possible," Baker said.

LOOT AND SCOOT: With no civil authority in Iraq and coalition troops unwilling to step in, anarchy rules Baghdad and other cities

As he spoke, the chatter of small-arms fire and the boom of explosions could be heard ringing in the distance. It was a reminder that first and foremost, security must be ensured by outside forces trained to do it. At the moment, with the institutions of Saddam Hussein's draconian security apparatus liquidated, there is a complete absence of civil authority in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq. Looting of government property by mobs of civilians is the norm in most cities and towns. Gunfights are common as factional struggles are played out.

Besides the lack of security in Baghdad and other Iraqi cities, there's a looming humanitarian crisis. Power outages are common. Food is fairly plentiful, but water supplies in some outlying districts of the Iraqi capital are dwindling. Hospitals are short-staffed as doctors and nurses are unable to get to work safely. Wards are filled with bodies of the wounded and dying.

US vs the UN: The new conflict

If the coalition forces do not move quickly enough to restore law and order and bring humanitarian relief, their military triumph may soon be undone. "Success or failure (after the military campaign) will be judged by our efforts in reconstructing Iraq. If we make Iraq a better and safer place, and people can see we are making it a better and safer place in the next few months, we will be on the road to genuine success," says Les Gelb, president of the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC.

WITH OPEN ARMS: Iraqis jostle to get relief packets being distributed by coalition troops

In the beltway in Washington DC, though, there is a sense of deja vu. Even while the battle for Baghdad draws to a predictable close, the familiar battle lines have been drawn between the Pentagon and the State Department. The bone of contention, once again, is the UN-a four letter word within some circles of the Bush Administration after the Security Council drubbing. While Secretary of State Colin Powell was keen on a greater UN role, the neo-conservative hawks in the Bush Administration led by Vice-President Dick Cheney and Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld were decidedly lukewarm to such a proposal. There was much carping over sharing the spoils with those who opposed the war while coalition forces gave their blood.

That tussle was reflected in the summit meeting between US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair in Belfast last week. Blair, who even during the weekend had held out the prime role for the UN, agreed to Bush's proposed doctrine. It envisages only a supporting role for the UN, well short of the commanding role that would have been required for the prime minister to keep his word with belligerent European allies. With this in hand, the coalition is expected to approach the UN Security Council for a fresh resolution endorsing the regime change in Iraq and also resuming humanitarian aid to the country.

Meanwhile, Bush and Blair announced in Belfast a three-part plan for the reconstruction and final liberation of Iraq. There would be a coalition military administration headed by retired US army general Jay Garner that would rule Iraq for the first six months. In the second phase, power would be handed over to the Iraqi interim authority, which will eventually give way to a UN-endorsed interim government. The aim is to ultimately have in place a constituent assembly in two years. In the meantime, a fresh constitution would be drawn up by indigenous and exiled Iraqis to pave the way for general elections in the country.

Who will be Iraq's Karzai?

As in Afghanistan, there is a search on for the Hamid Karzai of Iraq. Given that Saddam had his key opponents executed when he came to power in 1979 and afterwards prevented the emergence of any challenger, the political void is enormous. Especially since the Baa'th Party that once dominated the political spectrum is in total disarray. The major opposition groups, barring the two in Kurdish dominated areas, have very small bases. Among the hot favourites of the US to head an interim government is the suave Ahmed Chalabi, head of the anti-Saddam Iraqi National Congress (inc) who was flown in to Nasiriyah, his hometown in southern Iraq, as Baghdad fell.

CHALLENGES AHEAD Post-war Iraq presents a series of hurdles

LAW AND DISORDER Anarchy rules where Saddam once did. With no civil authority, mobs go about looting government property and gang fights between factions are common.

SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE Civic amenities are badly hit. Power outages are common and water scarce. Short-staffed hospitals are filled with the wounded and dying.

POLITICAL VACUUM Saddam eliminated possible rivals after coming to power in 1979 and prevented the emergence of a challenger. This has caused a political void in Iraq. America's favourite is a tainted banker, Ahmed Chalabi.

ECONOMY ON THE EDGE Ravaged by wars and sanctions, Iraq's oil-dependent economy is in poor shape. There is no industry, and agriculture has dipped. Most Iraqis lead a hand-to-mouth existence and need to earn daily to avoid starving.

SUCCEEDING SADDA: Jay Garner (left) will head the interim administration in Iraq; the Pentagon wants Chalabi (right) as ruler

A seasoned lobbyist in London and Washington, Chalabi studied mathematics at Chicago University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is described as a controversial figure, charismatic and determined but crafty and cunning at the same time. Chalabi has been accused by some opposition figures of using the inc to further his own ambitions. Some European experts dismiss Chalabi as a "crook", mainly because he was charged with and sentenced by a Jordanian court for fraudulent dealings of a bank he ran in Amman in the early 1990s. The Jordanian Government still has an Interpol red corner notice out for him.

Chalabi has the endorsement of the Pentagon but the cia and the State Department are opposed to him. The State Department has long been critical of Chalabi, believing he does not have enough internal support to run the country. "The US may not want to be perceived as installing a puppet," says Alexander Nicoll from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. "Probably they will bring someone we have not heard of!" Whether they liked Saddam or not, Iraqis interviewed here are deeply suspicious of the exiles who now project themselves as part of Iraq's new government. While Chalabi wants to emulate Karzai's success, chances are he will suffer the Afghan leader's misfortunes-to whit, assassination attempts. Political legitimacy for Messrs Chalabi & Co will not come easy, if at all.

The dangers of religious and sectarian rivalries too are coming to the fore. For long the Shias, who form 60 per cent of the population and dominate southern Iraq, have been ruled by the minority Sunni Muslim community that Saddam and his tribe from Tikrit belonged to. Says Peter Lawler, who teaches international relations at Manchester University: "There is a deep hostility between the Sunni minority and the Shia majority, which had been completely excluded from power under Saddam. There are tribal groupings, almost too complex for the western eye to discern." On top of this comes the rest of the social mosaic of Iraq-comprising 150 tribes, most of whom are at loggerheads with each other. There are signs that the Kurds living in northern Iraq, who form 20 per cent of the population, are keen on grabbing as much autonomy as possible. It has neighbouring Turkey, which also has a sizeable Kurdish population, concerned. Yet just as in Afghanistan, the presence of US forces would be the glue that will hold Iraq together. The problem is what happens after that.

Can an economic disaster be averted?

Part of the deepening predicament facing Iraqis, especially in Baghdad, is the simple inability to work. Most live on the edge, needing income every day to keep themselves and their families alive. Margaret Hassan, the Baghdad representative for Care International, underscores the problem: "If Iraqis can't work, they eventually can't eat, especially since the government-run rationing system-part of the UN-imposed 'oil-for-food' programme-is no longer operating."

ENTRY POINT: Coalition troops guarding the port of Umm Qasr which was used to bring in shipments of humanitarian relief to Iraq

Even before the onset of this war, the Iraqi economy bordered on collapse. Ravaged by two earlier conflicts and then 12 years of sanctions, the once thriving economy is in very poor shape. Though it has the second largest oil reserves in the world next only to Saudi Arabia, Iraqi refineries are functioning at 40 per cent of their capacities. Industry has been almost non-existent in the past decade. Agricultural production, despite the presence of two major rivers, has dipped drastically. Literacy levels have dropped from 85 per cent to 50 per cent because of the poor educational standards. Unemployment is riding high.

Unfortunately, there is very little institutional knowledge to go by to gauge the extent of damage to the economy. The last International Monetary Fund assessment was carried out 20 years ago. It is estimated that the Iraqi economy is about $28 billion, to which the oil sector contributes about 50 per cent. In addition, it has international debts of around $100 billion and dues in the form of Gulf War compensation of $199 billion. And, add to this its virtually non-existent financial system-the value of the currency has slid from one Iraqi dinar being worth $3 in the early 1980s to one dollar worth 2,700 dinars today.

The costs of providing immediate assistance and the rebuilding of the country will run into billions of dollars and could last a long time. "It is impossible to give an exact estimate until events unfold on the ground. But if I had a guess, I would say close to a decade of effort and hundreds of billions of dollars in cost," says Michele Flournoy, former deputy secretary of defence and now senior adviser to the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Already, the administration has earmarked sizeable funds for the reconstruction of Iraq. In the supplemental budget moved to the Congress, the President sought $2.4 billion for the State Department-led aid effort. This will be carried out by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The USAID had come in for fire lately for floating bids inviting private American companies to partake in the reconstruction process. Other analysts do not believe that the US would be able to manage an early exit from Iraq. They believe that two years would be a conservative time frame within which the Iraqi military and civil administration is first exorcised of Baa'th Party elements, recast and then trained to take over from the coalition forces. As Ambassador Joe Wilson, who was deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy in Baghdad from 1988 to 1991, puts it, "There is a tendency to wear rose-tinted glasses, to think and act too simplistically and to overstay our welcome, all bad signs going into an occupation."

However, not everyone is so cynical of the options that lie ahead. Daniel Pletka, vice-president, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute-a think tank closest to the Bush Administration-believes that drawing parallels with Afghanistan are misplaced. "In the overall situation, Iraq is light years ahead of Afghanistan on the development scale. Looting is a sign of oppression and poverty. One hopes that as coalition troops are able to provide a secure environment, the Iraqi people will come to understand that there are other ways of resolving their needs than through force."

Similar optimism exudes from the Bush Administration too. Not only is it steadfast in its belief that the task can be done, it is also convinced that its own blueprint is the best for Iraq. But if the coalition forces slip up it may well turn out to be a case of winning the battle only to lose the war.

-with Ishara Bhasi in London and Raj Chengappa.