ItAs the US forces entered Baghdad, major world powers reviewed their ties with the only superpower. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer hoped that the Saddam Hussein regime "will collapse as soon as possible". President Vladimir Putin averred that Russia did not wish to see the US face defeat in Iraq. President Jacques Chirac proclaimed in St Petersburg that "France and all other democracies welcome the fall" of Saddam's regime. The realistic Chinese remained noticeably silent. Nine of Iraq's Arab and Muslim neighbours provided overt and covert assistance to the US-led operation. In the midst of these developments, India chose to "deplore" the US action and called for the withdrawal of its forces. It reminded me of former Sri Lankan prime minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike who called for a cease-fire and withdrawal of Indian forces from Bangladesh in December 1971 just as they were entering Dhaka.

The US is India's largest trading and investment partner. Realism, not rhetoric, should govern its relationship. In his National Security Strategy unveiled in September 2002, US President George W. Bush said, "The US interests require a strong relationship with India." While praising India's democratic traditions and economic liberalisation, he said that the two countries have a "common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean". He added, "We share an interest in fighting terrorism and creating a strategically stable Asia." There is virtually no mention of Pakistan or any other South Asian country. The US needs Pakistan in its hunt for terrorists in Afghanistan and in Pakistan itself. It has concluded that it should support President Pervez Musharraf and the Pakistani Army to achieve its objectives. This is a relationship of political expediency, but one India cannot ignore.

Unlike in the past, the US no longer lectures India on the need to "cap" or "roll back" its missile and nuclear programmes. It urges Pakistan to respect the Line of Control. Bush sought and obtained a commitment from Musharraf to permanently end cross-border terrorism. The US praised the conduct of free and fair elections in Jammu and Kashmir, welcomed the initiation of a political process with the appointment of N.N. Vohra as the Government's interlocutor, and supported the "healing touch" policy of Mufti Mohammed Sayeed's Government in Kashmir. India's basic difference with the US is that while America supports a military-dominated political system in Pakistan, India believes that a "rogue army" that supports terrorism rules Pakistan. India should undertake an intensive dialogue with the US, not just on India-Pakistan relations, but also on Pakistan itself.

India is witnessing the beginning of cooperation with the US in areas like military-to-military contacts, training and technology transfers. This should be expanded. We should, however, for the present, not purchase weapon systems that would involve long-term dependence on the US for spares. The Pentagon shows greater understanding of India than the State Department, whose prejudices have encouraged Pakistani nuclear blackmail and provoked Indian resentment. India has made sustained efforts over the past two decades to build strong lobbies in the US Congress. This has paid dividends. Similar lobbies have to be fostered in American business and industrial circles. The nearly two million-strong, politically active Indian community in the US should be encouraged to strengthen this effort. Interestingly, those who are pro-India in the US are also pro-Israel. This factor is important in dealing with issues of global terrorism and hi-tech transfers. While there will be differences with the US on India's relations with Iran, the two should work together on developments in the Persian Gulf, especially on ending Saudi Arabian support for Wahabi fundamentalism.

The differences with the US on Pakistan are inevitable. These should be addressed maturely, through a dialogue. Sadly, India's rhetoric on Pakistan is not matched by action. India will lose credibility unless it eschews rhetoric and acts decisively and boldly when necessary. It should avoid making the dialogue with the US excessively Pakistan-centric. There should be a strategic vision for cooperation with the US for peace and stability across the Indian Ocean region. Cooperation with the US does not mean India should ignore its relations with other power centres like Russia, France, China, Germany, UK and Japan. It merely means that where it has differences with the Americans, it should address them through dialogue and not by a knee-jerk, anti-American rhetoric.

(The author is former Indian high commissioner to Pakistan)