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takes steps to ease the legal woes of expatriates.
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INDIA
TODAY HINDI
CURRENT
ISSUE MAY 12, 2003
NEIGHBOURS: PAKISTAN
Rocky Road To Peace
India and Pakistan are keen to temper expectations
with realpolitik, but there are strong compulsions that are propelling
the latest peace initiative.
By Raj Chengappa in Islamabad with Indrani Bagchi
in Delhi
Until he
made the famous telephone call on April 28, Pakistan Prime Minister Mir
Zafrullah Khan Jamali was unfamiliar to most Indians. Chosen to head the
tenuous coalition of parties cobbled by Pakistan President General Pervez
Musharraf in October last year, Jamali is widely regarded as the king's
man. His non-confrontationist approach suits the general, though Musharraf
is a trifle exasperated by his laidback style.
India and Pakistan are keen to temper expectations
with realpolitik, but there are strong compulsions that are propelling
the latest peace intiative
It would fall on Jamali's heavy-set shoulders to carry forward A.B. Vajpayee's
Srinagar initiative, as it is now known. The Indian prime minister's offer
of a "hand of friendship" has created a sliver of hope of the
dangerous 18-month-long impasse between India and Pakistan ending. In
his brief call to Vajpayee, Jamali broke the ice with some earthy homilies
that reflected his passion for hockey. He told Vajpayee in Urdu that just
as in sports "haar jeet hoti hai (winning and losing is part of the
game)" and the two countries should find a "way to move on".
The two leaders struck an air of informality. After inviting Vajpayee
to visit Pakistan, Jamali pushed aside his prepared text and said that
as the younger of the two, he was prepared to come to Delhi if Vajpayee
could not make it to Islamabad.
In Pakistan, the call generated widespread hope of a breakthrough and
a visible lifting of spirits. Pakistan Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokhar,
who was present when Jamali made the call to Vajpayee, cautiously described
it as "a good beginning". But Khokhar, who served as Pakistan's
high commissioner to India in the 1990s, knows that the road to rapprochement
between the two countries is littered with minefields and failed initiatives.
"Like porcelain, Indo-Pak relations have to be handled delicately
and sensitively. If you drop it, it will break," he says.
In Delhi, the Indian Government was careful to manage expectations of
the possibility of a dialogue in the immediate future. The Ministry of
External Affairs indicated that Pakistan had to put an end to crossborder
terrorism to set the "conducive atmosphere". But on May 2 there
was reason for optimism when Vajpayee revealed in Parliament the Government's
decision to appoint a new high commissioner in Islamabad and restore civil
aviation links on a reciprocal basis.
The earlier cautionary statements on both sides were directed at taking
care of the domestic political opinion. The past 18 months saw the largest
build-up of conventional forces at the border since the 1971 conflict
and even pushed India to the brink of war on two occasions. There were,
as one expert put it "gaalis (expletives) galore". Both countries
threatened to wipe out the other from the face of the earth with their
nuclear weapons. Now each side is keen to show that its policy has paid
off. With several states going to the polls this year, the BJP is keen
to demonstrate that its Government's hardline approach has yielded dividends.
For the Pakistan Government, it is important to demonstrate to the fundamentalist
groups that it has not compromised its Kashmir policy.
However, Pakistan realises that there is a need to act with speed before
the hawks step in and vitiate the atmosphere again. It is likely to soon
announce measures on crossborder terrorism soon that may satisfy India
Islamabad has moved away from its stated position that "it has done
everything possible on the matter and could do nothing more". Foreign
Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri hinted at it when he said, "We will
try to do something that will lower the temperatures. How far we succeed
depends partly on India." (see interview)
TALL PRAYER: Jamali (left) is optimistic even
as terrorists step up violence in Kashmir
As a reciprocal gesture, Pakistan is pressing India for non-initiation
of combat operations in the Valley as had been done once before. India
also wants Pakistan to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure and ban
organisations like the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Pakistan may agree. But as Lt-General
(retd) Javed Ashraf Quazi, a senator and former communications minister,
jokes, "How many of them do you want us to ban? Soon there will be
no one left to ban except parties like the PPP."
Despite scepticism over the success of the latest initiative, there
are some ground realities that will propel the process forward in the
coming weeks. Vajpayee realises that his policy of coercive diplomacy
was bringing diminishing returns. The build-up of troops did stampede
Musharraf into making his January 12 speech that saw Pakistan take major
steps against terrorist organisations. This sufficed until the Jammu and
Kashmir elections in October, 2002.
In recent months though, Vajpayee's policy was proving counterproductive.
For it meant that whenever terrorists struck-as they did in Nadimarg on
March 23-Vajpayee had war as the only option. With the US keen on not
destabilising the Afghan situation, India found beating the war drum was
not paying off. That was one reason why India demobilised its troops from
forward positions last year. It is significant that since the attack on
Gandhinagar's Akshardham temple in September 2002, the Government has
avoided blaming Musharraf directly. This has allowed both sides some space
to manoeuvre. Vajpayee was also possibly waiting for a decent interval
between last year's crisis to return to the dialogue table.
The Indian Government was also waiting for the political situation in
Pakistan to stabilise after the return to civilian rule since October.
By propelling the pml(q) headed by Jamali to power, Musharraf has ensured
that the Government remains his handmaiden. The only thing Musharraf had
not calculated was the stunning performance of the Muslim fundamentalist
parties that banded together under the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and
won 67 of the 342 seats in the National Assembly. The MMA also stormed
to power in the NWFP and is part of the coalition Government in Baluchistan-Jamali's
home province. For Musharraf, the fundamentalists have been a source of
constant headache. They recently created a deadlock in Parliament demanding
that Musharraf give up his dual post as army chief. Knowing it would be
suicidal, Musharraf has refused and indicated he would do so only when
the political situation stabilised.
INDO-PAK
SUMMITS
A History
of Betrayals
60s1964: Prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru sends Jammu and Kashmir
chief minister Sheikh Abdullah to hold talks with Pakistani president
Ayub Khan. The outcome of the talks is ambiguous. 1965: In an operation
codenamed Gibraltar, Pakistan sends infiltrators into India across
the 470-km cease-fire line in Kashmir. Prime minister Lal Bahadur
Shastri orders Indian troops to cross the border and they reach within
kilometres of Lahore. The Tashkent Agreement is signed after a Soviet
Union-facilitated cease-fire in January 1966.
70s 1971: Pakistan
launches air strikes on Indian airfields. India retaliates, defeats
Pakistan and Bangladesh is born. 1972: Under the Simla Agreement
signed by prime ministers Indira Gandhi and Z.A. Bhutto, the LoC
is demarcated. Bhutto promises the LoC will be made into the international
border, but reneges on returning to Pakistan.
80s1987: President
Zia-ul-Haq hops across to watch a cricket match in Jaipur, a clever
bit of diplomacy intended to de-escalate tension after India's Operation
Brasstacks. 1989: Prime ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto
meet in Islamabad to sign a pact on not attacking each other's nuclear
installations. The failure: no agreement on Siachen.
90s1997: Prime ministers
I.K. Gujral and Nawaz Sharif establish a Delhi-Islamabad hotline.
It is rarely used. Foreign secretaries K. Raghunath and Shamshad
Ahmad try to form an agenda for a dialogue, but there is no consensus
on Kashmir. 1998: Foreign Office-level talks are held on the eight
issues decided earlier. No conclusion. 1999: Prime Minister A.B.
Vajpayee rides to Lahore on a bus and signs the Lahore Declaration
with Sharif, even as army chief Pervez Musharraf is plotting Kargil.
Pakistani troops cross into India in May and a 50-day war ensues.
US pressure forces Pakistan to withdraw in July.
00s2001: Vajpayee
calls for a Kashmir cease-fire and invites Musharraf for talks in
Agra in July. Musharraf uses the opportunity to crown himself president
of Pakistan and insists on meeting the Hurriyat for tea. His persistence
on Kashmir as the focus of the dialogue derails the talks. In October,
Pakistan-backed terrorists attack the Assembly in Srinagar, and
in December 2001 the ISI-supported Jaish-e-Mohammed attacks the
Indian Parliament.
It appears that Musharraf has weathered the storm and is firmly in the
saddle for the next couple of years. He has the army well in command.
Vajpayee too realises that he has to do business with Musharraf whether
he trusts him or not. After the Agra disaster, the general has been keen
to re-establish his credentials with India. He was hurt when Vajpayee
spurned his overtures at Almaty, Kazakhastan, and has since made efforts
to bring down crossborder terrorism. He was, however, disappointed that
Vajpayee didn't reciprocate earlier.
Yet Musharraf knows the importance of Vajpayee's latest overture and
will grab it with both hands. Apart from bolstering his credibility with
the jehadis by getting the Indians back to the negotiating table, he hopes
it will bring back foreign direct investment which has all but dried up
because of the tensions. Though the US has repeatedly bailed him out financially,
Musharraf wants to make peace with India as quickly as possible and is
backing his proxy, Jamali, to the hilt. Says Lt-General Rashid Qureshi,
the President's spokesperson: "There will be no impediment to the
talks on the President's part. He supports it fully and the Government
will not let the opportunity pass."
There are other dynamics at work that might push the two countries towards
a dialogue. Saddam Hussein's swift ouster in Iraq has brought back American
pressure for the situation in the subcontinent to stabilise. To Pakistan's
disappointment, the US is not planning to change the existing order in
South Asia as they are in West Asia. That means the US wants India and
Pakistan to agree on a stable "status quo" and keep the region
free from tension. Mushahid Hussain, a PML(Q) senator and former information
minister, says, "The US role is like the fire brigade. It wants to
douse the flames and cool temperatures. But nothing beyond that."
Pakistan believes that the US has brought pressure to bear on India
to begin the dialogue-something India strongly denies. Indian Foreign
Secretary Kanwal Sibal maintains that all through the recent interaction
with senior US officials there has been no pressure from them on a dialogue
with Pakistan. Yet it does seem more than a coincidence that there has
been a flurry of developments preceding the visit of Deputy Secretary
of State Richard Armitage to the subcontinent. Says Kanti Bajpai, expert
on strategic affairs: "Clearly some of it is being done under international
pressure. The Americans have been keen to get things going, and this is
the least we could do."
The US Administration, for its part, says it is pleased with the progress.
State Department officials reiterate they are encouraged by the statements
from both sides and would like to see some level of continued contacts
"which may be cultural, economic or political" such that the
war- like postures cease. Stephen Cohen, senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution and someone who has for long worked on South Asia, is one
who has struck more than just a cautionary note on the current thaw. "The
structural differences between the two countries are too deep. They seem
to be conspiring to make the Americans believe that they are serious,"
he says.
LINE OF FIRE: Indian soldiers keep vigil (above)
as militants rally in Muzaffarabad
So is the Srinagar initiative going to end up like Lahore and Agra? Or
will we, as Kasuri puts it, "be third time lucky"? There are
some indications that the two sides have learnt lessons from their experiences.
Such as trying to avoid staking everything in an ill-prepared summit as
in Agra. Says Khokhar: "You don't climb a mountain by starting from
the top. We need a carefully prepared route to reach summit-level talks."
Niaz Naik, a former foreign secretary and key negotiator, agrees, "Go
step by step. Take it quietly, not in a spectacular way." Naik prefers
the Helsinki approach of dividing everything into baskets of issues and
forming expert groups to deal with them. One such could be on economic
trade, the other on cultural ties and a third on issues like Kashmir and
terrorism.
Indian experts also prefer a graduated, carefully choreographed approach.
G. Parthasarathy, former high commissioner to Pakistan, says, "There
has to be engagement. Measures like sending a high commissioner, people-to-people
contact are welcome as the first step in that process. However, dialogue
at the foreign secretary or ministerial level should only be undertaken
after an assessment of what should be the agenda and the objectives of
such talks." In short, the process should be strung out and made
sustainable so that not everything appears as a grand gesture. Also as
Cohen points out, "To get a lot, you have to give up some. Right
now, both sides believe that they can get a lot without giving up anything.
They have to realise that concessions have to be made."
India and Pakistan are once again at the crossroads. A correct turn
now and it could unleash a wave of peace and prosperity. A wrong one could
find both countries again staring at the abyss.