| This week's meeting between External Affairs Minister K. Natwar Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Khurshid Kasuri marks the end of a road that both countries found it convenient to travel on for the past year. The positive noises emanating from the meeting will provide cover for what both sides hope will be a "productive" meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf in New York on September 22. | | NO ILLUSIONS Singh with Kasuri (right) on the sidelines of the SAARC ministerial meeting held in Islamabad | But the process has ground to a halt and no amount of unilateral Indian measures to take the process forward will infuse fresh oxygen into it. The reasons for this are more complex than mere rising infiltration figures in Jammu and Kashmir; it has its roots in Pakistan's terrorism cooperation with the US, its crackdown on militants, and, as some analysts say, the cracking open of Pakistan's jehadi core. It was at Musharraf's insistence and under intense US pressure that India agreed to start the dialogue even though the Pakistan President hadn't delivered on terrorism. It had seemed then that the assassination bids on Musharraf had been epiphanic in his newfound resolve to destroy terrorism. That resulted in the January 6 summit between former prime minister A.B. Vajpayee and Musharraf, where he promised "no territory under Pakistan's control" would be used against India. Delhi promised to go back to the dialogue table. In these nine months, the composite dialogue has run full circle, with India flooding the table with around 75 proposals. IRAQ HOSTAGE CRISIS TRYST WITH FREEDOM | | The collective sigh of relief in India was palpable, as the Kuwaiti Gulf and Link Company (KGL) declared on September 1 that the shadowy Iraqi group Black Banners had released three Indian hostages-Antaryami, Sukhdev Singh and Tilak Raj kidnapped on July 21. The brutal killing of 12 Nepalese hostages by the Ansar al-Sunna army on August 31 sent a frisson of fear through the Government, particularly as Nepal erupted in anti-Muslim riots in retaliation. It was not a prospect the Government wanted to imagine. | | RELEASED Indian, Kenyan and Egyptian hostages freed after a month by their kidnappers, the Black Banners, in Iraq | But a steady course of negotiations and back channel diplomacy appeared to have paid dividends and as Minister of State for External Affairs E. Ahamed declared, "It is a matter of pride for all of us that our people have been released consistent with our policies without sacrificing any of the principles." India, Kenya and Egypt had taken a collective decision not to pay any ransom to the kidnappers. There have been several last minute misses in this as well. On August 7 negotiations suffered a setback with the kidnappers rescinding from a deal at the eleventh hour. Channels of communication between the transport company and the kidnappers had to be realigned and Iraqi tribal chief Sheikh Hisham Al-Dulaimi exited as mediator from the talks. Dulaimi was famous as having asked for Indian film stars to appeal for their release. It has been the untiring efforts of three people, Talmiz Ahmed, the Indian ambassador in Oman who was appointed as point man for the negotiations, Indian ambassador in Baghdad B.B. Tyagi and Ahamed in Delhi. Discussions proceeded apace after a new Egyptian mediator entered the picture, but one that was out of the public eye. The two Indian envoys stepped up their engagement with the Iraqi religious leaders who used their influence with the kidnappers to ensure the physical safety of the hostages. The negotiator, an Egyptian, told the Arabic-language TV network al-Arabiya on September 1 he was able to free the hostages with the help of Egyptian, Indian and Kuwaiti officials. "We were able to negotiate calmly with the kidnappers and ensure the release," he said. There were no demands. As of September 1, 124 people had been kidnapped in Iraq this year, of whom 22 had been killed. Most of the hostages have not been part of the US-led coalition. | But in these months too, Pakistan has had to deliver on terrorism to the US on a number of fronts, including high-value Al-Qaida operatives. It has mounted expeditions in Waziristan, Balochistan in the teeth of popular protests to recover terrorists. Homegrown terrorism ratcheted up in Pakistan to the extent that Pakistan Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and military leaders have been targets. The arrest of Pakistani extremist leaders Fazlur Rahman Khalil and Qari Saifullah have heightened the strain, while the arrest of Al-Qaida leaders like Noor Naeem Khan and Ahmad Ghailani have increased Musharraf's indispensability to the West. He is also expected to relinquish his uniform in December and he might strike a deal with the religious parties to stay on as army chief. In Afghanistan, Pakistan supports the return of the Taliban under the umbrella of the Hizb-e-Islami leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, but here too has been pressured to back off so that the October elections are held without incident, a key element in the politics of the US elections. None of this has made the US popular inside Pakistan. According to Indian assessments, the US is now more actively disliked than even old enemy India. This, India counts as one of the signal successes in its peace initiative, which is premised on people-to-people contacts. In the short term, India's priorities are focused on two areas-softer borders and the security fence on the loc. In the longer term, India wants to operationalise its peace proposals. However, all roads end in Kashmir. All Pakistani statements insist that without "forward movement" on Kashmir, no trade or confidence-building measures (CBMs) can thrive. India maintains that for talks on Kashmir to progress, trust and confidence are essential. It is also the reason for Delhi's proposals (see graphic), which span trade, exchanges, Siachen and release of fishermen. Pakistan disagrees. What is the new Pakistani strategy all about? The simplest answer is that the "squeeze" on all other fronts has apparently convinced Musharraf that the Kashmir terrorism tap should be reopened. Besides, with the dialogue process yielding little in terms of "substantive" concessions from India on J&K, and public opinion no longer hostage to ritual hostility, Pakistan's strategic road map on Kashmir needs to go back to the terrorism route. It is a high-wire act. To keep making Al-Qaida arrests means having to go after the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed (banned but active nevertheless) that were created with India in mind. Challenging these groups affects Pakistan's game plan in J&K. Recently Musharraf told a Pakistani newspaper that these groups would "pack up" once the Kashmir problem was resolved. The argument that Pakistan has been using with the US is equally simple. According to diplomatic sources, it is the old play of "help me act against the terrorist groups in Pakistan by pressuring India to make concessions on Kashmir". Senior Indian officials said indignantly, "It is as if we are the bad boys." India has swallowed its disappointment with the "Faustian bargain" of the US with Pakistan but call Islamabad's argument untenable. Nevertheless, the ministers' meeting may see more Indian concessions in terms of visas and visits from Pakistan. Pakistan might push for another round of foreign secretary-level talks, but since this will not include terrorism, India is unlikely to agree. The bottom line is terrorism and on this Pakistan has not delivered and shows no signs of changing its mindset. Since June, infiltration has made quantum leaps. India finds this unacceptable and as the incidents in the Valley go up, this will increasingly be the focus of Indian diplomatic exchanges. However, Delhi is clearly at a loss to get Pakistan to toe the line without actually breaking off talks. According to security agencies, Pakistan believes it can continue to maintain a steady level of infiltration and terrorism in Kashmir without forfeiting the peace process. Meanwhile, India's proposals have been met with studied silence from Pakistan. The only ones likely to go through relate to strength of missions, release of fishermen and notification of ballistic missile tests. Pakistan has proposed a joint working group on CBMs and a separate mechanism to discuss Kashmir, as well as involving the "true representatives" of J&K. India is unlikely to allow these at the table. Among Kasuri's engagements in India is a meeting with the separatist Hurriyat leaders. This is part of Pakistan's renewed Kashmir strategy. It was after the foreign secretary-level talks in June that the Pakistan spokesman declared, "What is acceptable to Pakistan would be acceptable to the Kashmiris." Pakistan doubled efforts to unite the Hurriyat factions behind the hardline Jamaat leader, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, prime beneficiary of Pakistani largesse. When that did not happen, the Mirwaiz's uncle was killed.The resultant split saw the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami openly supporting Geelani's outfit, Tehrik-e-Hurriyat. The Hurriyat dialogue with the Central Government dried up. India's big failure continues to be that it has not been able to engage or protect the moderate elements in the Hurriyat while Pakistan takes charge of the separatist agenda. But in a new tack, India will try to change the terms on Kashmir. Indian officials stated "the solution to J&K should be acceptable to the people of India, including the people of the state". India also plans to mount a democracy offensive to highlight the "diverse nature" of J&K, and describes "genuine representatives" as those who have been elected. India also plans to focus attention on the "other" Kashmir, in PoK, by highlighting the lack of political autonomy or representative government there. Critics of the Indian approach on the peace process to Pakistan say unilateral gestures are counterproductive because they may be interpreted by Pakistan as India's desire to keep the process going at all costs. Security analysts predict a period of relative quiet until the snows melt in spring. After that India is bracing for the worst. |