What is history but a fable agreed upon?" Napoleon Bonaparte once remarked. In the days of the court historians that would probably have been true. But in the age of electronics where every conversation, telegram or letter can be accurately recorded for posterity, history does not lie. It usually isn't very comfortable either for those that made history to have it replayed to them. Former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger found that out last week when the US State Department released a detailed study of declassified papers of what it termed the South Asia Crisis of 1971. That crisis saw India and Pakistan go to war resulting in the liberation of Bangladesh. The war was brutally short and swift-just 13 days and it changed forever the history and geography of the subcontinent. It saw Indira Gandhi emerge as the Iron Lady of Asia. It also saw America decisively tilting towards Pakistan, even sending its Seventh Fleet to the Indian Ocean in an effort to browbeat India.

PICTURE SPEAK
DECEPTIVE AMITY: Indira with Kissinger (left); Nixon and Indira at the arrival ceremony at the White House

The undiplomatic language used by two of the world's most powerful men, Kissinger and US President Richard Nixon, in their private conversations to describe Indira had its own shock value. In one such conversation, at the Oval Office on November 5, 1971, Nixon describes his meeting with Indira a day earlier saying: "We really slobbered over the old witch." They then went on to discuss the crisis brewing in East Pakistan, with Kissinger telling Nixon: "The Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting a war there ... While she was a bitch, we got what we wanted too." After strong protests from the Congress party, Kissinger even apologised, telling an Indian television network, "I regret that these words were used. I have extremely high regard for Mrs Gandhi as a statesman. The fact that we were at cross purposes at that time was inherent in the situation but she was a great leader who did great things for her country."

PICTURE SPEAK

FACES OF THE WAR: (from top) Sheikh Mujib and commander of Eastern Command Lt-General J.S. Aurora; Khan; jubilant soldiers after India's victory in Bangladesh

While much of the history of the differences between the US and India over the 1971 crisis is known, what's important about these documents is that they provide a rare, unbiased insight into the Nixon Administration's handling of a critical moment in subcontinental history. What comes through starkly is that the campaign is conducted by the White House, primarily by Nixon and Kissinger, who was then his assistant for National Security Affairs. There is evidence of deep divisions between the White House and the State Department on the course of action to take against India. Nixon and Kissinger make it clear that they need to preserve their new-found friendship with China forged that year even at the expense of relations with India. That in the desire to back an ally and old friend, Pakistani dictator Yahya Khan, they were even willing to risk a war with the Soviet Union, who was backing India then. Also that they had misread India's true intentions and believed that India wanted to annex the whole of Pakistan. Lt-General J.F.R. Jacob, chief of staff of India's Eastern Army Command, who had played a key role in the liberation of Bangladesh, says: "It's amazing that they believed so when we never had a plan to annex territory in West Pakistan. What's clearly evident throughout the papers is Nixon's tilt towards Pakistan."

That is apparent right from the day the war begins. Kissinger told the members of the Washington Special Action Group on December 3, 1971: "I've been catching unshirted hell every half-hour from the President who says we're not tough enough. He really doesn't believe we're carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt toward Pakistan and he believes that every briefing or statement is going the other way." The next day Nixon is still hopping mad and wants Kissinger to cut off all US aid to India, including what was given as relief for the thousands of refugees who fled to India even before the war. Nixon tells Kissinger: "By God, I can't emphasise too strongly how I feel. We told Mrs Gandhi we're going to cut off that aid ... And you're examining every other possibility of how we can squeeze India right now."

In the same conversation they chalk out a strategy to blame India for starting the war in Pakistan. They ignored the fact that Khan had failed to respect the huge mandate given to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman by East Pakistan in the general election of December 1970. That he then had Rahman arrested in March 1971 and launched a brutal war of suppression that saw millions of refugees fleeing to India, putting an enormous strain on the country's resources. Yet Nixon, brushing aside advice from his State Department, coolly tells Kissinger: "I think it's very important to put the burden on India on this, Henry." Then they discuss why they should get tough, with Kissinger saying: "It was bad enough when, with our money, they dragged us around in the UN. When have these bastards ever supported us?" Nixon replies: "Never." And Kissinger adds: "What can they do to us that they aren't doing now? I mean, if they want to be Russian stooges and have the Russians spend a billion dollars there a year, we can't prevent it." Nixon shows no remorse when he reviews what US public opinion would be, telling Kissinger: "I know all the arguments that well then we're choosing sides, we're not neutral. Of course, we're not neutral. Neither are the Indians. They're always neutral against us."

PICTURE SPEAK

ON THEIR GUARD: Indira with Nixon

That there is division between the State Department and the White House is evident in many of the conversations. In one such, secretary of state W. Rogers tells Kissinger on December 5, two days after the war began: "I think we shouldn't act just in petulance." The next day, frustrated by the US' inability to make any impact on India's war plans, Nixon tells Kissinger: "This woman suckered us. But let me tell you she's going to pay." Nixon saw China as offering perhaps the best prospect of putting pressure on India. "I think we've got to tell them that some movement on their part, we think towards the Indian border, could be very significant. Damn it, I am convinced that if the Chinese start to move the Indians will be petrified."

It is also apparent through the declassified documents that the CIA had a mole in Indira's cabinet-a serious breach that needs investigation. On December 7, the CIA presents to Nixon a top secret briefing of Indira to the cabinet where she "outlined her objectives as: a) The quick liberation of Bangladesh. b) The incorporation into India of the southern part of Azad Kashmir for strategic rather than territorial reasons (because India has no desire to occupy any West Pakistan territory). c) To destroy Pakistani military striking power so that it never attempts to challenge India in the future." In retrospect, if that briefing was accurate, American pressure did work because India was able to achieve only the first of its objectives.

Nixon decided to send an aircraft carrier to the Indian Ocean to "scare" India. But as India moved to a decisive victory in East Pakistan, the urgency to block any plan to annex West Pakistan grows. On December 6, 1971, Nixon tells Kissinger: "Threaten to move forces or move them, Henry, that's what they must do now. Now, goddammit, we're playing our role and that will restrain India." They also discuss getting China to put pressure on India. Nixon tells Kissinger: "The Chinese have not warned the Indians that they're going to come in. And that's the point, they've got to warn them ... All they've got to do is move something. Move a division. You know, move some trucks. Fly some planes. You know, some symbolic act." The frustration shows with Nixon angrily asking for a concerted effort to publicise India's role in the crisis: "Get a white paper out .. I want the Indians blamed for this, you know what I mean? We can't let these goddamn sanctimonious Indians get away with this ... Here they are raping and murdering. They talk about West Pakistan. These Indians are pretty vicious."

On December 12, 1971, the White House has information that the Chinese are finally showing some interest in making threatening moves against India. That raised the question of the likelihood of Soviet military action against China and its implications. Kissinger said: "If the Soviets move against them and then we don't do anything, we'll be finished." Nixon shockingly asks: "So what do we do if the Soviets move against them? Start lobbing nuclear weapons in, is that what you mean?" Kissinger responded: "If the Soviets move against them in these conditions and succeed, that will be the final showdown. We have to-and if they succeed we will be finished. We'll be through." Kissinger tentatively suggested: "Then we better call them (the Chinese) off." But then quickly concluded: "I think we can't call them off frankly." His reason: "If the Russians get away with facing down the Chinese and if the Indians get away with licking the Pakistanis-we may be looking down the gun barrel." But as it turned out the Chinese had not decided upon military action in support of Pakistan but more to go along with the US in the UN resolutions for a ceasefire and mutual troop withdrawal.

A little later, Nixon gets the message that he has been waiting for-the Russians assure the US that India would not annex West Pakistan. Turning to the decision made earlier in the morning to confront the Soviet Union with military force if necessary in support of China, Kissinger said: "What you did this morning Mr President was a heroic act." Nixon ruminates over how difficult it is to get the government to move and says: "It's the whole attitude, the whole government, the whole American establishment would say, well, don't borrow trouble. It's all going to work out. Nothing ever works out unless you do something about it. That's the trouble with the world." Nixon may have been kind to himself in his memoirs. But history unfortunately can be a much harsher judge.

Index