PICTURE SPEAK

OLIVE BRANCH: Winning over civilians will help counter terror

While the army mourned the loss of a highly trained officer in this surgical strike in Jammu and Kashmir last November, it consoled itself with the fact that it had caused little collateral damage to the congested village. Had the same operation been conducted a few years ago, it would have involved hundreds of troops cordoning the village and house-to-house searches. The target would probably have been demolished, perhaps resulting in civilian casualties and denting the army's image.

Surgical strikes is how the army hopes to fight low-intensity conflicts or 'sub-conventional operations' (SCO) in the new doctrine unveiled by Army Chief General J.J. Singh. It faces its acid test in the recent massacre of over 50 people in Assam by the ULFA. The army has rushed in 3,000 soldiers, but it will certainly not use fighter aircraft to pop smart bombs into insurgent homes or call for artillery strikes on militant hideouts, like other armies in South Asia, because the SCO doctrine says civilians' hearts and minds-and not dead terrorists-are at the centre of the entire operation.

OPERATIONS IN THE PAST

RIFLE-READINESS Rifle held with both hands. SEARCH-AND-DESTROY MISSIONS Conducted even on the mere suspicion of militants staying in a village. COLLATERAL DAMAGE Houses burnt down to kill militants hiding inside. PHOTOGRAPHS Troops posed with bodies of militants as trophies. ATTRITION Inevitable in the initial phase of insurgency. Large number of troops deployed. Killing militants was the primary aim. KINETIC FORCE Emphasis was on maximum use of force to take on militants and go in for kills.

The doctrine, compiled by the Shimla-based Army Training Command, is a euphemism for the low-intensity conflict it has been fighting for nearly two decades in Jammu and Kashmir and twice as long in the North-east. "It is our collective wisdom based on the experience of five decades of fighting low-intensity conflict, including proxy war, counter-insurgency and limited conflict," said General Singh of the guidelines which will be provided to all levels of the army on the precepts of tackling an insurgency.

While most of its provisions are already being practised, formally laying it down in a seminal document will make it a reference guide for all its leaders, from the major commanding a company to an army commander. The SCO doctrine comes exactly a month after the US Army released its counter insurgency (or coin) field manual. It reveals, for the first time, its institutional thought on the new face of war. If the army traditionally fought shy of committing troops to prolonged internal security duties, the new doctrine outlines a prosaic truth-sub-conventional wars are here to stay as a form of warfare and will seek increased involvement of the armed forces in times to come. The doctrine's precept is at variance with the Government which wants to bulk up the paramilitary forces as the weapon of first resort to tackle internal insurgency. While the doctrine says that Communist-inspired insurgencies are on the decline, it forgets to mention the Maoists of South Asia who are on the upswing.

OPERATIONS FROM NOW ON

RIFLE-READINESS Hands-free profile among civilians. New three-point sling allows rifle to be slung on shoulder. Less threatening. SEARCH-AND-DESTROY MISSIONS Surgical operations based on precise intelligence inputs. COLLATERAL DAMAGE Unacceptable. Houses will not be burnt down. PHOTOGRAPHS Unacceptable. No posing with dead militants. ATTRITION Shift towards manoeuvre, indirect approach. Isolate terrorist and launch surgical strikes. KINETIC FORCE Psychological approach. Win over civilians.

Not region-specific, the SCO doctrine predicts the emergence of religious, cultural and socio-economic faultlines as the cause for future strife. The army will fight these wars with a nimble iron fist-the focus is on manoeuvre warfare as opposed to attrition warfare. Simply put, small teams of highly trained troops will constantly try to outwit the enemy.

The velvet glove is feather-soft. In telecom jargon, soldiers are asked to keep weapons "hands free", maintain a friendly face and respect local customs. "The doctrine's emphasis on people-friendly operations is its most important aspect,'' says Lt-General (retd) V.G. Patankar. "When people are your centre of gravity, your decisions will never be grossly wrong."

Among the doctrine's other directives is the need to reorient the soldier's mindset from fighting "the enemy" to fighting his "own people", namely terrorists hiding among civilians. The army hopes to fight this guns-and-roses war through manoeuvres and force multipliers, like surveillance devices, helicopters for troop insertion, drones and dogs. "Earlier, we would directly confront terrorists. Today, we use an indirect approach," says General Singh.

The doctrine calls for the judicious use of force, urging security forces to neutralise terrorists rather than seek their elimination. It calls for the integration of human, signal and electronic intelligence to present a cogent picture of the conflict zone and lays down guidelines for protecting human intelligence sources, discouraging hasty operations which could endanger the source. Instead, it recommends the creation of an interface for sources to transmit intelligence without terrorist sympathisers getting wind of it.

INTERVIEW: GENERAL J.J. SINGH

PICTURE SPEAK "The infrastructure of terror is intact. We keep intercepting infiltrators on the border. It is actions on the ground which will determine change." "Iron fist with a velvet glove" In an interview with Assistant Editor Sandeep Unnithan, Army Chief General J.J. Singh outlines the fundamental precepts of the new doctrine Q. What is the core philosophy of the doctrine? A. We felt a need to synthesise our collective wisdom based on the experience of five decades of fighting low-intensity conflicts. The doctrine will serve as a guideline for all commanders leading troops in such an environment now and in the future. Q. Is the statement of the army being committed to internal security duties an admission of ground reality? A. It's our primary role to defend the country from external aggression. But now the likelihood of all-out conventional wars is getting remote. There is a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir, insurgency in Assam, and problems in Naxal-infested areas. Q. The doctrine speaks of manoeuvre warfare as opposed to attrition warfare. A. Earlier, we directly confronted terrorists. Today, we use an indirect approach: isolate them, get information of their location and launch surgical strikes. My emphasis is on intelligence-based and people-friendly operations. When you only kill the terrorist, the villagers react positively because they are fed up of terrorists. In Jammu and Kashmir, support for foreign terrorists is waning. Q. How do you reorient troops to fight 'our people'? A. Sub-conventional wars have no fronts and defined enemies. You have to be very careful in areas inhabited by your own people. You want to win the hearts and minds of the population without using force. When innocents are killed, you alienate the populace. Q. Do you foresee a troop reduction in Jammu and Kashmir? A. When levels of violence come down, that is the time for us to look at reducing numbers. For the immediate present, we are likely to maintain more or less this force level. Q. Is there a decline in cross-border support for terrorists? A. They (Pakistan) may have made pronouncements, but on the ground we continue to get reports that people are being trained. The infrastructure of terror is intact and we keep intercepting militants infiltrating into India. It is actions on the ground that will determine the change in attitude.

To be reviewed every five years, the doctrine emphasises that South Asia is the epicentre of global terror and, hence, the future can only be more grim-terrorists armed with improvised nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; asymmetric threats with transnational signatures, meaning the masterminds would be based in foreign lands. All of these will call for the army's support.

Yet, what is perhaps the doctrine's biggest flaw is that it fights shy of laying down the larger strategic framework in which terrorism-especially the kind perpetrated by fundamentalist jehadis-thrives in South Asia. It is silent on the root cause and redressal of this menace. That is why strategic experts are loathe to call it a doctrine.

"Merely compiling a list of politically-correct adjectives does not make a doctrine,'' explains Dr Ajay Sahni, executive director, Institute for Conflict Management, adding: "Doctrines deal with larger issues like terrorism. Dealing with terrorists is a tactical question worthy of a field manual. Operating among civilians is for a book of ethics.'' This is one of the questions the army will have to address when updating its doctrine.

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