Nov 23, 1998

Slowly but steadily the United States seems to be bringing India and Pakistan to see things its way.

By Manoj Joshi

So far the contest has been one of hard volley and return. India’s nuclear tests, US sanctions. Indian defiance, American denunciation. Now, inexorably, the game seems to be getting tougher for India. The partial lifting of US sanctions and the near certainty of Pakistan signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has taken the post-Pokhran Indo-US dialogue to a new level. Last week, at the end of what are being called "technical talks" between Indian and US officials in New Delhi, Indian officials predictably claimed victory citing a US statement expressing satisfaction over India’s commitment to non-proliferation and acceptance of the need for enhanced export controls.

But perhaps they did so too soon. At the end of the week, in a move that had been expected for some time, the US published a list of some 200 ‘entities’ with whom all dealings were banned. The list led off with the predictable laboratories and establishments of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), which in many cases were already under a US embargo. What was new was the inclusion of every defence establishment, ordnance factory and defence public sector unit as well as educational institutions like the Institute of Mathematical Sciences, Chennai, the Institute of Physics, Bhubaneshwar, Mehta Research Institute of Maths and Maths Physics, Allahabad, all departments of aerospace engineering and space technology at the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, Department of Physics, Aerospace Engineering and Space Technology cell at the IIT Mumbai and Chennai.

Speaking on the condition of confidentiality, American officials said this list was based on a careful reading of US laws. They discounted Indian claims that last week’s talks on export control had been as successful as claimed by Indian officials. According to one US delegation member, Washington remains concerned over what he said were "gaps" in the Indian laws of export controls.

"Of particular concern to us is India’s inability to check movement of illegal diversion of sensitive technology transiting through India." He said his delegation would come back with a set of detailed suggestions next month on what India could do to address US concerns. Another round of talks would then be held in early January 1999. Indian officials say they welcome any US suggestions in tightening what they say are already tough laws. But, they point out, diversion of goods in transit is an issue that the US or the country where the goods originated has to examine. Indeed, and somewhat tartly, they referred to the way in which Pakistan managed to smuggle out high-tech goods from the very countries that were now trying to persuade India to tighten its laws.

"Grey area" commerce, said an Indian official who participated in the talks, "is a category in itself and the US is quite familiar with it." Discordant perceptions of the same set of talks arise because of the differing goals of the two sides. India sees the discussion as a means of engaging the US in a discourse that would eventually lift the 20-year-old US high-tech embargo of India. But the US views the talks as a means of getting India to put in place the kind of restrictions on exports that the member countries of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Australia Group (chemical precursors for weapons) have, without any promise of reward. The US and its allies want additional shackles embodied in the technology lists specified by these agreements which are actually private cartels and not international treaties.

For example, the US wants India to add 20 chemicals to its list of chemicals that are restricted under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). New Delhi says the Indian record on restricting the sale of all war material has been impeccable. It points to the self-imposed restrictions during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war when almost all arms exporting countries literally made a killing by exporting all manner of munitions to the combatants. India says that its laws and procedures are more than adequate to regulate the export of sensitive technologies, especially the ones it is committed to restrict as per its international treaty commitments such as the CWC.

The discussion on export controls is a satellite to the wider dialogue between the prime minister’s Special Envoy Jaswant Singh and US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. Currently, they are engaged in a more complex discussion on what precisely India means by the term "minimum nuclear deterrent". American officials say that in lieu of the Indian unwillingness to spell this out, they are offering suggestions such as signing CTBT, moratorium on the production of fissile material and non-deployment of nuclear weapons, missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft, or the identification and separation of fissile material for civilian and military use.

Beyond denouncing Washington’s suggestions, New Delhi has offered little by way of explanation. Part of its inability arises from a reluctance to allow the armed forces a role in nuclear force planning. But, according to experts, without the involvement of armed forces it is not possible to decide how much is enough-civilians are incapable of giving accurate inputs as to what would be the outcome of a nuclear strike and as to what a "minimal" deterrent would look like. Given its obstinate refusal to confront these issues, New Delhi is reducing its own room for manoeuvre.

The US has already begin to up the pressure on India by easing the sanctions on Pakistan while maintaining it on India. US officials claim that the difference between the treatment of India and Pakistan in the order lifting sanctions is a one-time affair designed to help Pakistan overcome its economic crisis. Suspiciously, this move has been accompanied by reports that the Japanese plan to lift their sanctions on Pakistan while leaving those against India in place.

There are other straws in the wind as well. Last week, Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz made known his country’s willingness to sign the CTBT and discuss with India the non-deployment of nuclear weapons tested in May. Talbott’s statement on November 12 issued at Washington’s Brookings Institution appears to indicate the limit of US accommodation. The best India can hope for, he seemed to suggest was some kind of a quasi-nuclear status.

Viewed in this context, the stated US goals of preventing an escalation of nuclear and missile competition in the region, strengthening the global non-proliferation regime and promoting dialogue between India and Pakistan remain rooted in the belief that it can still turn the nuclear clock back in South Asia. To further this goal, the US remains committed to ‘balancing’ India and Pakistan, which given the ground realities seem to mean a pronounced tilt towards Islamabad. New Delhi wants Washington to overcome its obsession with Pakistan and deal with India as a major global player. Given the recent developments, India has to now manoeuvre carefully so that it is not isolated since Pakistan remains determined to play any game that serves to check India. Some of the straws in the winds indicate that the going may get tougher for New Delhi. This week, there are indications that the Japanese will lift all the sanctions they imposed on Pakistan after its nuclear tests, but leave in place similar measures against India.

At the end of the day, the key decisions will be taken from a political rather than technical perspective. But Singh and Talbott—who meet in Rome for the fifth round of their talks later this week need to clear these issues so as to have a meaningful dialogue. But eventually what will count is India’s ability to withstand the pressure of the US, its staying power and diplomatic skills.

© Living Media India Ltd